

Status Externalities in Education and Low Birth Rates in Korea*

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Abstract

East Asians, especially South Koreans, appear to be preoccupied with their offspring's education—most children spend time in expensive private institutes and in cram schools in the evenings and on weekends. At the same time, South Korea currently has the lowest total fertility rate in the world. Motivated by novel empirical evidence on spillovers in private education spending, we propose a theory with status externalities and endogenous fertility that connects these two facts. Using a quantitative heterogeneous-agent model calibrated to Korea, we find that fertility would be 28% higher in the absence of the status externality and that childlessness in the poorest quintile would fall from five to less than one percent. We then explore the effects of various government policies. A pro-natal transfer or an education tax can increase fertility and reduce education spending, with heterogeneous effects across the income distribution. The policy mix that maximizes the current generation's welfare consists of an education tax of 22% and moderate pro-natal transfers. This would raise average fertility by about 11% and decrease education spending by 39%. Although this policy increases the welfare of the current generation, it may not do the same for future generations as it lowers their human capital.

Keywords: Fertility, Status, Externality, Education, Human Capital, Childlessness, Korea

JEL codes: D13, E24, I2, J10, J13, D62, O40

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1 Introduction

South Korea (henceforth Korea) has an extremely low total fertility rate. For almost two decades now, Korea's fertility rate has been among the lowest in the world (reaching a record low of 0.78 in 2022), below that of other low-fertility countries such as Germany or Italy. The Korean government has expressed concerns over low birth rates, as the latter imply rapid population aging and pose a considerable challenge to the public pension system. Starting in 2006, the government launched a billion-dollar program to reverse the decline. In 2020, 37 billion USD (2.1% of GDP) was spent on policies aimed at boosting fertility.¹

Another notable feature of Korean society is that children's education is very highly valued by parents. This preoccupation with education is sometimes called "education fever," echoing the title of a popular book by Michael Seth (2002). Many teenagers attend math and English classes in private education institutes called *hagwons*, often as late as midnight. Others, meanwhile, spend numerous hours each week with a private tutor. Participation rates in after-school programs are around 75%. These private education investments are so expensive that, on average, an individual family spends as much as 9.2% of their income per child on education (even though most children attend public schools).

In this paper, we propose a new mechanism that connects high education spending with low birth rates. The novel ingredient is a status externality in which parents value the education of their children *relative* to the education of other children. The concern for status seems particularly relevant in Korea, and East Asia more generally.² A connection between status concerns and "education fever" in Korea has been made before (Sorensen 1994; Kim and Lee 2010). Extremely low fertility rates coupled with high education spending is a feature of other East Asian countries as well, such as in China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. While our analysis relies on data from Korea, we believe that the mechanism and policy implications may apply throughout East Asia.

¹Source: "The Fourth Basic Plan on Low Fertility and Aging Society," published by the Korean Presidential Committee on Aging Society and Population Policy in 2020 (available only in Korean at <https://www.betterfuture.go.kr>).

²For example, Jinkins (2016) and Podoshen, Li, and Zhang (2011) find that Chinese consumers care more about peer beliefs and conspicuous consumption than American consumers. These differences between East Asian and Western consumers are considered to be related to Confucianism and a culture of interdependence in East Asia (Wong and Ahuvia 1998).

We use micro data from Korea to explore whether spillovers in private education spending across families indeed exist. Using regional variation in the change of late-night curfews on *hagwons* as instruments, we find that lower spending on private education among relatively rich families lowered private education expenditures of socioeconomically disadvantaged (i.e., low-income or low-education) families. Since much fewer children from these relatively poorer families attend *hagwons* late at night and thus are less likely to be directly affected by the late-night curfew changes, our evidence points to the existence of spillovers across families.

Motivated by this evidence, we incorporate status externalities in education into a quantitative overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. The model features heterogeneous agents, where potential parents choose the number of children and how much to invest in the latter's education, incorporating a quantity-quality trade-off. The children's human capital is a function of parental spending on education and a stochastic learning ability that captures parental background as well as luck. Agents differ in their human capital—largely determined by their parents—as well as an exogenous preference shock. We model the status externality by assuming that parents derive utility from the human capital of their children relative to the human capital of other people's children. Given the status externality, the key object of the equilibrium is the distribution of human capital, which is endogenously determined as a fixed point.

We calibrate our model to Korea, using data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study. We use the calibrated model to understand fertility choices and education investments in Korea and to conduct policy experiments. In particular, we use our reduced-form spillover estimate to discipline the degree of externality in the model. The first finding from the calibrated model is that the status externality plays an important role in fertility decisions: in its absence, fertility increases by 28%. The reason is that the status externality drives up education investments, which makes children costly and induces parents to have fewer offspring. This channel especially affects the poor. Indeed, childlessness falls from five percent to less than one percent in the lowest-income quintile when the status externality is eliminated. Removing the externality therefore changes the slope of the fertility-income relationship from positive to negative. This is an interesting result in that Korea displays a positive fertility-income relationship, whereas fertility and income are negatively related in most other countries. We also use our model to revisit the role of social norms on

the role of women for fertility choices explored by [Myong, Park, and Yi \(2021\)](#).

We use the quantitative model to study the effect of several government policies. Motivated by actual policies recently introduced in Korea, we consider pro-natal transfers and Pigouvian-style taxes on private investment in education. We find that pro-natal transfers increase the fertility rate as intended, with a magnitude that is in line with recent empirical estimates of the fertility effects of the pro-natal cash bonus in Korea ([Kim 2020](#)). Meanwhile, they decrease education spending per child, and do so to a greater extent among low-income families. As a result, human capital, output and consumption are lower in the new steady state. We also investigate the effect of a tax on education spending, as an alternative method of addressing the externality. Such a tax does indeed reduce education spending, while raising fertility. As parents choose to invest less per child, they experience an increase in consumption, while future generations experience lower human capital and consumption. These findings indicate that both policies would necessarily involve some intergenerational conflict by lowering future generations' human capital and output.

Finally, we explore the optimal policy mix that maximizes the welfare of the initial parent generation. We find that the optimal policy is an education investment tax rate of 22% and moderately large pro-natal transfers—a monthly child allowance of 62 USD (2.6% of average income) for 18 years. This optimal policy increases the fertility rate by 11%, lowers the childlessness rate by more than half a percentage point and decreases education spending by 39%. The effects on fertility and education are heterogeneous along the income distribution, with the largest effects felt among the poorest quintile of parents. While this policy addresses the distortion caused by the status externality and is optimal from the perspective of the first generation, we find that it does decrease human capital and output over time. Thus, although the welfare of the parents' generation increases, future generations are worse off compared to a world without the policy, at least in terms of average utility. We also revisit the policy experiments using a version of our model that incorporates the idea of college slot scarcity with parents who value the college enrollment of their children. We find that the results from this tournament model are broadly in line with those from our status externality model.

Our research builds upon the economic analysis of fertility pioneered by [Becker \(1960\)](#) and, more specifically, the quantity-quality trade-off first modeled by [Becker](#)

and [Tomes \(1976\)](#). Many subsequent analyses have used this framework in quantitative models to understand fertility differences over time and across countries ([Greenwood and Seshadri 2002](#); [Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005](#); [Manuelli and Seshadri 2009](#)) and to study the aggregate and distributional implications of fertility in the presence of endogenous human capital investments and heterogeneous households ([de la Croix and Doepke 2003](#); [Cordoba, Liu, and Ripoll 2016](#); [Cavalcanti, Kocharkov, and Santos 2020](#)). Some recent work, including that of [Sommer \(2016\)](#), [Guner, Kaya, and Sánchez-Marcos \(2021\)](#) and [Daruich and Kozlowski \(2020\)](#), consider rich heterogeneous agent life-cycle models while abstracting from the quantity-quality trade-off. Recently, family policies such as government-subsidized daycare and subsidies for having children have been analyzed in quantitative models, though these typically use models with exogenous fertility ([Domeij and Klein 2013](#); [Hannusch 2019](#); [Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura 2020](#)). See [Doepke et al. \(2023\)](#) for a survey of this literature.

The key novel ingredient in our fertility model is a status externality in education. While a sizable body of work on relative status concerns does exist, dating back to [Veblen \(1899\)](#), the importance of status has not been explored in the context of fertility choices. Though much of the literature analyzes conspicuous consumption, the idea that people may overinvest in education because private returns are greater than social returns has been around for a long time ([Akerlof 1976](#)). [Ramey and Ramey \(2010\)](#) argue that competition in college admissions leads to an education externality in the United States, but their analysis also leaves out fertility implications. The macroeconomic implications of status concerns have been analyzed by several authors—e.g. [Abel \(1990\)](#), [Gali \(1994\)](#) and [Ljungqvist and Uhlig \(2000\)](#)—while [Genicot and Ray \(2017\)](#) theoretically explore the effect of status externalities on inequality. None of these papers considers the implications for fertility. The only exception may be [Easterlin \(1966\)](#), who argues that aspirations formed during childhood affect fertility choices as adults.

In contrast to a large part of the fertility literature concerned with excessively high birth rates (e.g., [Lee and Miller \(1990\)](#)), we provide a framework in which birth rates can be too low in the presence of a status externality. A few other reasons for fertility being below socially optimal levels have been set forth. [Schoonbroodt and Tertilt \(2014\)](#) argue that the lack of property rights that parents have over their (future) children causes the social benefit from child-bearing to exceed the private benefit,

leading parents to choose too few children. [Doepke and Kindermann \(2019\)](#) argue that fertility might be inefficiently low when men and women disagree about fertility and husbands and wives bargain about having children. A similar argument is made in [Ashraf, Field, and Lee \(2014\)](#). [Jones \(2022\)](#) points out that fertility may be too low in a growth model with idea spillovers. Note that these papers use various notions of optimality. Indeed, the definition of efficient levels of endogenous fertility is beset by conceptual and philosophical difficulties. [Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt \(2007\)](#) propose the alternative concept of \mathcal{A} -efficiency, which we apply herein.

Finally, there is a largely empirical literature that studies fertility in Korea specifically. For example, [Lee \(2009\)](#) provides a general survey of potential reasons for low fertility and policy responses. The possible connection between the East Asian “education fever” and low fertility was perhaps first pointed out by [Anderson and Kohler \(2013\)](#) in a purely empirical study, also of Korea. [Hong et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Kim \(2020\)](#) both study the recent introduction of pro-natal transfers in Korea and find small but positive effects on fertility. [Ma \(2016\)](#) and [Myong, Park, and Yi \(2021\)](#) set forth an alternative explanation for low fertility in Korea by noting the recent increase in female labor force participation together with strong family values that expect mothers to stay home with their children.³ We explore social norms on the role of women as an alternative explanation in Section 5.2 and find it to be less important for our 1970-1975 cohort of women.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and present our empirical findings on the relationship between fertility and education and spillovers in private education spending in Korea. In Section 3, we set up the model. Section 4 explains how we calibrate the model. Section 5 explores the sources of low fertility using our calibrated model. In Section 6, we study the effects of pro-natal transfers and education taxes. In Section 7, we solve for the optimal policy mix that maximizes the utility of the first generation. In Section 8, we investigate the tournament model to analyze the idea of college slot scarcity as a source of the externality in education. Section 9 concludes.

³A family values explanation has similarly been given for certain low-fertility European countries ([Billari and Kohler 2004](#)). However, these countries have comparatively higher birth rates than Korea, and in some cases, fertility has recently been trending upward again. Thus, [Anderson and Kohler \(2013\)](#) argue that strong social norms alone cannot fully explain the Korean case.

2 Fertility, Education, and Education Spillovers

In this section, we show how fertility and private education expenditures in Korea vary along the income distribution. We then provide evidence of externalities across families in private education spending. The documented facts forms the basis for the quantitative analysis in this paper.

Our analysis is based on the longitudinal samples from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). We use the cohorts of women born between 1970 and 1975. A robustness analysis in Appendix A.5 shows similar findings using women born earlier. Fertility is measured by completed fertility.⁴ We will document income gradients in fertility and education investments. As we are interested in a permanent measure of income at the household level, we construct long-term household income as in Chetty et al. (2014) and focus on two-parent households.⁵

2.1 Fertility and Private Education


Panel A of Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the average number of children and average household income in each income quintile. The relationship is generally positive: the number of children increases from 1.80 for the lowest-income quintile to 2.03 in the highest-income quintile. This finding suggests that low birth rates in Korea are related to factors affecting low-income households. One way to quantify the relationship between fertility and income is to estimate the income elasticity of demand for children following Jones and Tertilt (2008). It is 0.082 in our data.

The positive income-fertility relationship may appear puzzling given that fertility and income are negatively related in most countries and over time. For example, Jones and Tertilt (2008) find negative elasticities for all cohorts of U.S. women going

⁴Completed fertility is the average number of children ever born, typically measured after age 40. It is 1.9 in our data for the 1970-1975 cohort which is higher than the total fertility rate of 0.9 in 2019. Naturally, the total fertility rate is lower than the completed fertility rate, reflecting the declining fertility trend in Korea.

⁵Specifically, we use the average income of two-adult households in which the woman's age is between 40 and 43. Focusing on two-adult families enables us to abstract from the different fertility choices of single vs. married women and to circumvent comparisons between the income of one- and two-adult households. Though, as the fraction of one-adult households is relatively small (8%) in our data, including single women does not significantly change our results, as shown in Appendix A.6.

Figure 1: Fertility by Income Quintile



Notes: We group households into quintiles based on their long-term income and calculate average completed fertility and the childlessness rate in each quintile for cohorts born in 1970–1975.

back to 1825.⁶ Elasticity estimates from the US cohorts that most closely correspond to our data are around -0.2.⁷

We also consider childlessness, the extensive margin of fertility choice. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the childlessness rate has a negative relationship with family income, decreasing from 5.3% for the lowest-income quintile to 2% in the highest-income quintile. Poor families thus are substantially more likely to have no children. Although the absolute level of childlessness is low in Korea, its clear income gradient confirms that the extensive margin is also important to understanding the positive relationship between fertility and family income.

Next, consider private education. Korean children spend much time in after-school programs and with private tutors. While some of these activities are related to physical education, art and music (and may be considered leisure activities), a large portion of children also attend after-school programs to learn English and improve their math and computer skills (see Table 1). The high participation rate is even more striking given the fact that private education is expensive in Korea. In our data, we

⁶An exception to the negative fertility-income relationship are the most recent U.S. cohorts. Bar et al. (2018) document that fertility is upward-sloping for very high incomes. While they relate this phenomenon to the marketization of time, concerns about relative education might also play a role.

⁷Jones and Tertilt (2008)'s estimates are based on men's income. When male income is used instead of family income in our dataset, the relationship between fertility and income remains positive, with an estimated elasticity of 0.096.

Table 1: Private Education Participation Rate (2019, %)

	Average	Elementary	Middle	High
Any subject	74.8	83.5	71.4	67.9
A. Main subjects	56.7	57.9	61.8	57.8
a. Individual tutoring	8.9	6.4	10.4	14.3
b. Group tutoring	9.3	10.5	10.0	7.6
c. <i>Hagwon</i>	41.1	37.6	50.7	46.0
d. Others	20.4	32.1	11.3	6.9
B. Art, music, physical activities	44.0	67.4	26.2	15.3
a. Individual tutoring	5.6	7.3	4.6	3.6
b. Group tutoring	5.0	7.8	3.1	1.0
c. <i>Hagwon</i>	34.8	55.9	17.1	10.3
d. Other	5.8	9.2	3.4	1.3

Notes: The main subjects include Korean, English, math, science, second foreign language, writing and computer science. Other activities may include online education programs or home-based sessions with tutors from education companies. Note that the total is not the sum of the lower categories, since a single child may, for example, attend a *hagwon* and have individual tutoring lessons. Source: "Private Education Participation Rate by School Level" from [Statistics Korea \(2020\)](#).

find that total education expenditures per child amount to 9.2% of family income.⁸ Thus education spending is surprisingly high in Korea even though empirical evidence shows that returns to private education are quite low by international comparison ([Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2018](#)).

To assess how education expenditures vary across the income distribution, we use detailed information on private education expenditures, disaggregated by child's age, from individual-level survey data. Table 2 displays the percentage of family income spent on private education by quintile for children at different stages of their education. We find that poorer families spend a higher percentage of their income on private education at most stages. The last column, which shows overall education spending over a child's entire education, reveals that parents in the bottom income quintile spend 3.3 percentage points more of their family income than those in the top income quintile. The income elasticity of demand for private education is

⁸Specifically, we begin by calculating the education expenditures and incomes separately by child's age from birth to age 24, which corresponds to the age range we use in our model. We then divide the sum of expenditures by the sum of after-tax income. See Appendix A.2 for details.

Table 2: Percentage of Income Spent on Private Education

Income quintile	Pre-school	Elementary school	Middle school	High school	Weighted average
1st	8.9	9.0	8.4	5.7	8.4
2nd	6.8	8.0	8.5	6.1	7.4
3rd	6.1	7.7	7.6	6.6	7.0
4th	5.6	6.7	7.4	6.9	6.5
5th	4.6	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.1

Notes: This table shows the percentage of income spent on private education per child at each stage of education. The shares are calculated by dividing the average expenditures by the average income of the corresponding income quintile. The last column shows the average expenditures across different education stages weighted by the number of years spent in each education stage. See Appendix A.2 for more details. The appendix also includes the level of spending and the fraction of households with no private education spending by income quintiles (see Tables A2 and A3).

equal to 0.698, which is substantially less than one.

2.2 Spillovers in Private Education Spending

We now provide empirical evidence for spillovers in education investment across families. We do this by analyzing how parental investment decisions are affected by others in the same region. The presence of such spillover effects motivates our model of status externalities in education developed in the following section. Specifically, we estimate the effects of spending in private education among relatively rich families on education spending of other families. To address potential endogeneity issues, we exploit recent changes of curfews that banned private education beyond a certain time of the day (10 or 11 p.m.) implemented across regions in different years (Choi and Choi 2016; de Silva 2021). The curfews reduced participation in private education programs, and hence spending, largely among the rich.⁹ We thus use the curfews as instrumental variables (IV) for education spending among the rich.

To satisfy the exclusion restriction, it is important that the dependent variable is not

⁹We focus on parents with a middle-school student since curfews are more relevant for older students than elementary-school students and actual curfew variations are more prominent for middle-school students than high-school students, as shown in Figure A3. We consider the 2009–2015 period during which curfew variations were concentrated. Appendix A.3 provides details.

directly affected by the curfew changes. In other words, ideally one should consider only families whose children were not attending *hagwons* after 10 p.m. Although this information is not available in our baseline data, data from the Korean Time Use Survey in 2009 reveal that only around 15% of students attend *hagwons* at 10 p.m. or later and that families with low socioeconomic status are much less likely to send their children to *hagwon* late at night, as shown in Figure A4. As such, the dependent variable of individual private education spending is constructed based on families with income below the median (*low income*) or those where both parents have at most a high school degree (*low education*).¹⁰

Formally we estimate the following two-stage least squares regression:

$$\ln E_{st} = \delta_{10}\Lambda_{st}^{10} + \delta_{11}\Lambda_{st}^{11} + \gamma'\mathbf{X}_{ist} + \epsilon_{ist} \quad (1)$$

$$\vartheta_{ist} = \beta \ln \hat{E}_{st} + \eta'\mathbf{X}_{ist} + \varepsilon_{ist}. \quad (2)$$

In the first stage, we regress the log of E_{st} , private education spending per student among the rich in region s at time t , on a set of indicator variables for the presence of a curfew at 10 p.m. and 11 p.m., Λ_{st}^{10} and Λ_{st}^{11} respectively.¹¹ Then, in the second stage, we regress ϑ_{ist} , private education spending per student relative to overall household expenditure of (either low-income or low-education) family i in region s at time t , on the log of the predicted regional spending \hat{E}_{st} of high-income families. This gives the main coefficient of interest β , which captures the spillover effect.

To compute the regional spending among the rich (E_{st}), our baseline estimation uses the top 15% income group.¹² This choice is based on our finding that the first-stage F-statistic is the largest with the top 15% group, compared to other income groups as reported in Table A5. Both equations include a vector of control variables in \mathbf{X}_{ist} such as family income, parental education, parents' age groups and province fixed effects. Since curfew changes over time tend to be synchronized across provinces as shown in Appendix A.3, curfew indicators are correlated with time fixed effects,

¹⁰In doing so, we also circumvent the reflection problem (Manski 1993) because the regressor is based on rich families.

¹¹Since 12 p.m. curfews are in place for all provinces during the estimation periods (as shown in Appendix Figure A3), the effects of the 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. curfews are relative to the 12 p.m. curfew.

¹²Regional averages based on our KLIPS samples can be noisy since the number of samples becomes very small at some regions. Therefore, we rely on the Private Education Expenditures Survey (PEES) microdata to compute E_{st} . See Appendix A.3 for details.

Table 3: Estimation of Private Education Spillovers using Instrumental Variables

Samples:		Low Income		Low Education	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A.	β	0.065	0.049	0.039	0.042
2nd stage	s.e.	(0.014)	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.043)
Panel B.	δ_{10}	-0.146	-0.092	-0.148	-0.089
1st stage	s.e.	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.028)
	δ_{11}	-0.060	-0.033	-0.054	-0.019
	s.e.	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.031)
	F-stat.	16.6	4.4	20.0	5.2
Year FE		No	Yes	No	Yes
Obs.		1,501		1,528	

Notes: Each column presents the results from a two-stage least-squares regression where curfew indicator variables are used as instrumental variables. Panel A shows the main coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression. Panel B shows the first-stage regression results. We report the wild bootstrap clustered standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008) in parentheses, given the relatively small number of clusters.


which would adversely affect the efficiency of our estimation. Thus, we consider both specifications, with and without year fixed effects.

Panel A of Table 3 shows that the estimated β is positive and highly statistically significant for both samples considered in the specifications without year fixed effects (columns 1 and 3). When adding time fixed effects, not surprisingly, the instruments are weaker, and the estimates become more noisy. It is reassuring, however, that the size of the coefficient remains roughly the same, about 0.04–0.06, across all specifications. An estimated value of $\beta = 0.04$ implies that a 10% reduction in the top 15%-income households' spending on private education decreases spending for the lower half of the income distribution by around 0.4 percentage points.¹³ These findings point to sizeable spillovers in education spending across families.

Panel B of Table 3 shows that the first-stage F-statistic is large in both cases, confirming the relevance of our instruments. Notably, the estimated values of δ_{10} and δ_{11} are negative, and δ_{10} is much larger in absolute value than δ_{11} with smaller stan-

¹³The average ϑ_{ist} is around 6% in the sample used for the estimation.

Figure 2: Curfew Changes and Trends in Private Education Spending



Notes: The lines depict the average log private education expenditures for the treatment (with a curfew change since 2011) and control groups (with no curfew change) as specified in the main text. The shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

dard errors. This implies that the earlier curfews reduced regional private education spending per child by more than the later curfews. This is reasonable because a later curfew is less restrictive by definition and also because only a few students (around 3% as shown in Figure A4) attended *hagwon* after 11 p.m.

To inspect if curfew adoptions across provinces were plausibly exogenous, we compare the log of private education spending for two groups of provinces using the Private Education Expenditures Survey (PEES) microdata in Figure 2. The first group (treatment group) includes families in provinces with curfew changes from 2011 to 2013, and the other group (control group) includes families in provinces with no changes since 2009.¹⁴ Clearly, pre-trends are not distinguishable between the two groups, suggesting that the curfew adoption variations are unlikely due to policy reactions in response to a rising pre-trend in regional private education spending.

We also explore the trends of private education spending for different income groups. We find that the differences between the groups become statistically most pronounced when using the top 15% income families (instead of the top 50%), reinforcing our choice of the top income group in the first stage and in the structural model pre-

¹⁴Figure 2 excludes one province, Daejeon, where the curfew changed in 2009, the start year of the analysis window. Including Daejeon does not make a significant change. See Appendix A.3 for more details.

sented in the next section. See Figure A5 in the appendix for details.

3 The Model

Our model builds on the quantity-quality literature where parents choose the number of children and how much to invest in each. The model is an overlapping generations model, where each generation lives for two periods: as children and as adults. For expositional convenience, we present the model in a recursive formulation and let a variable with a prime denote its value in the next period. As in most of the literature, we assume asexual reproduction; that is, we abstract from marriage and model only a generic parent. Similarly, we do not distinguish between boys and girls and thus abstract from gender differences in parental inputs.¹⁵ We assume that fertility, n , is discrete. This is not only realistic, but also naturally leads to childlessness as an equilibrium outcome for some parents.¹⁶ For some parents, the cost of having a child will be so high (relative to income) that they may prefer not to have any offspring. Parents also choose education investments into their children, which, together with luck, determines the human capital of the children once they are adults.

As documented in Section 2, fertility and private education investment varies across the income distribution. To reproduce these empirical patterns in the model, we introduce several dimensions of heterogeneity. Potential parents differ in their own levels of human capital, and hence income, which leads them to make different fertility and education investment choices for their children. However, since human capital is endogenous in the model (each parent is a child of a previous parent), we introduce two exogenous sources of heterogeneity so that the income distribution in equilibrium is non-degenerate.¹⁷ First, parents differ in their relative taste for

¹⁵In reality, parental inputs are higher for boys than girls. But the gaps have substantially declined in Korea over time, so that current gender gaps are small (Choi and Hwang 2020).

¹⁶The importance of distinguishing the extensive and intensive fertility margins was recently emphasized by Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder (2014) and Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015). We do not consider infant mortality in our model as it is negligible in South Korea.

¹⁷We focus on human capital transmission and abstract from wealth transfers since bequests are quite rare in Korea. Kim (2010) finds that the fraction of households that ever had inheritance receipt in Korea is only around 3%, much smaller than in the US where it is around 28%. The lack of bequests is likely related to the tax system. Korea has the second-highest tax rate for inter-vivos transfers and inheritance to children among OECD countries, up to 50%.

own consumption relative to leisure and utility from offspring. Second, parents draw their child's idiosyncratic ability that is correlated across generations. This idiosyncratic ability enters into the human capital production function, as described in detail below.¹⁸

The novel feature of our model is a *status externality*. There are two standard ways to model such externalities in the literature. [Abel \(1990\)](#)'s *catching up* with Joneses assumes that utility depends on the *previous* period's consumption, whereas [Gali \(1994\)](#)'s *keeping up* with the Joneses considers utility that depends on *current* aggregate consumption. In our model, parents care about the quality of their children relative to other children. Specifically, we model this by assuming the following functional form in the utility parents derive from the number n , and the human capital, h' , of their children:

$$\phi(n) \log(h' - \chi \tilde{h}') \quad (3)$$

where \tilde{h}' is the benchmark human capital which is a statistic from the marginal distribution of children's human capital $\mathfrak{F}(h')$.¹⁹ The strength of the externality is determined by $\chi \geq 0$. The status externality may in fact originate from deeper sources such as intense aspirations ([Genicot and Ray 2017](#)) or the distinct school grading system in Korea that heavily uses norm-referenced evaluations. As the common theme of these various sources is parents' concern about their children's relative performance, we assume that the benchmark in parents' utility is children's human capital.

Parents also derive utility from the number of children, captured by $\phi(n)$. We require this function to be increasing and concave. When parents choose the number of children, n , in addition to investing into their human capital, they also have to pay a fixed time cost of λ per child.

We assume that children's human capital is formed through three different inputs: an idiosyncratic (genetic) ability component κ that is stochastically inherited from

¹⁸Having both sources of heterogeneity gives significant flexibility to the shape of the fertility-income relationship and allows for both directions of causality. Parents with higher human capital may choose to have more children because of an income effect, or fewer because of a substitution effect. They may also react to the quantity-quality trade-off differently. Finally, potential parents with strong preferences for children may choose to work less and hence have less income. This last channel is less common in the literature, but is considered in [Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt \(2010\)](#), among others.

¹⁹We adopt the same functional form of externality as in [Ljungqvist and Uhlig \(2000\)](#).

parents, baseline human capital θ , and private education investments x .²⁰ Ability is correlated across generations following a Markov chain, drawn from a discrete distribution: $\kappa \in \{\kappa_k\}_{k=1}^{N_\kappa}$ with the transition probability of π_{jk}^κ where j denotes the ability index of a parent with ability κ_j^p . This seeks to capture the fact that high-ability parents are more likely to have children with high abilities.²¹ Parents decide on the amount x to invest in each child after κ is realized. We assume that these are complementary and choose the following functional form, which is similar to the specifications used in [de la Croix and Doepke \(2003\)](#) and [Cavalcanti, Kocharkov, and Santos \(2020\)](#):

$$h' = A_h \kappa (\theta + x^\alpha) \quad (4)$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. The parameter $\theta > 0$ guarantees that even if parents choose zero education for their children, the children will have some baseline human capital. This can capture raw intelligence and publicly provided education, for example. $A_h > 0$ adjusts the scale of the human capital production.

A parent's ex-post preferences (after all uncertainty is resolved) can then be summarized by the following utility function:

$$U(c, l, n, h', \tilde{h}') = b \log \left(\frac{c}{\Lambda(n)} \right) + \nu \frac{l^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \phi(n) \log(h' - \chi \tilde{h}') \quad (5)$$

where b is the preference type mentioned above. Some people intrinsically prefer a "market-consumption lifestyle" (i.e., high b), whereas others intrinsically prefer a "family-leisure lifestyle" (i.e., low b). We assume that b can take N_b possible values: $b \in \{b_i\}_{i=1}^{N_b}$ with the corresponding probabilities $\{\pi_i^b\}_{i=1}^{N_b}$. As is standard in the literature, utility depends on household consumption expenditures c divided by the household equivalence scale, denoted by $\Lambda(n)$. Parents value leisure l , weighted by $\nu > 0$. The curvature of utility from leisure is captured by $\gamma > 0$. Unlike b , both ν and γ are assumed to be identical across people.

The timing within a period is as follows. Parents start the period endowed with hu-

²⁰We abstract from parental time as inputs in human capital production and assume parental time is a fixed cost. If one added it, it could in principle either amplify or dampen the role of the externality on monetary investments depending on the degree of substitutability between time and monetary investments ([Yum 2023](#)).

²¹Thus, in our model children's earnings are related to their parents' earnings for two reasons: genetics and investments. This dual role of parents is supported by empirical evidence, e.g. in [Fagereng, Mogstad, and Rønning \(2021\)](#) who compare adopted and own children to understand intergenerational wealth transmission.

man capital h and their own ability κ^p (which was relevant during their childhood). The preference type b is then realized. Given b , agents choose fertility n , taking into account expectations about their potential child's ability. Once the children's ability κ is realized, parents make decisions regarding education investments, labor supply, and consumption.

Given the above timing assumptions, the parental decision problem can be summarized in two steps. First, the parent makes a discrete fertility choice, not yet knowing the ability of her children. For simplicity, we assume that all children of a given parent have the same ability. The choice problem in the first step is thus to choose the number of children:

$$\max_{n=0,1,\dots,N_n} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\kappa|\kappa^p} V(h, b, \kappa, n; \tilde{h}) \right\}, \quad (6)$$

where $V(h, b, \kappa, n; \tilde{h})$ is the household's value of having n children of type κ . The second step optimization gives a value function defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} V(h, b, \kappa, n; \tilde{h}) &= \max_{c,x,l} \left\{ b \log \left(\frac{c}{\Lambda(n)} \right) + \nu \frac{l^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \phi(n) \log(h' - \chi \tilde{h}') \right\} \quad (7) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad &c + xn \leq wh(1 - \lambda n - l) \\ &h' = A_h \kappa (\theta + x^\alpha) \\ &l \in [0, 1 - \lambda n], \quad \tilde{h}' = \Gamma(\tilde{h}). \end{aligned}$$

This optimization problem shows that parents invest in their children's education given the number of children and the realized ability shock. The household's time endowment is normalized to one. The total time available for labor supply and leisure decreases with the number of children, since each child requires λ units of time. Denoting leisure as l , labor supply in efficiency units is given by $(1 - \lambda n - l)h$. Finally, the Γ function describes the law of motion for \tilde{h} as perceived by households. In equilibrium, this should be consistent with the actual law of motion for \tilde{h} . Note that parents care about children in a warm-glow fashion as parents are not altruistic in the Barro-Becker sense (Becker and Barro 1988; Barro and Becker 1989).²²

²²A fully altruistic model with status externalities would lead to a complicated game across generations and dynasties, as parents would need to consider their own children's choices as well as those of other dynasties when choosing education inputs. This is different in the standard Barro-Becker model which collapses to a planning problem. With externalities, the equivalence between the equilibrium and a planning problem breaks down, see Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007) for details.

Children are costly in our model for several reasons. First, each child requires an education investment in form of the endogenous expenditure x . Second, a larger household with more children would reduce utility through the household equivalence scale channel $\Lambda(n)$, since the same consumption expenditure must be shared by more people in the household. Finally, children require time inputs, which reduces the time that can be used for leisure or labor supply.

Note that although parents would always have a positive expected utility when they choose to have a non-zero number of children (otherwise, they would prefer childlessness), we do not rule out the possibility of negative ex-post utility from children. This is possible when the children's ultimate level of human capital is low (specifically, $h' - \chi \tilde{h}' < 1$ in our case), which would be the case among unlucky parents of modest means whose children's idiosyncratic ability is low.

Finally, to close the model, we assume that aggregate production is linear in aggregate labor. Specifically, letting L be average efficiency units of labor, output per capita is given by $Y = AL$ where A is total factor productivity.

The equilibrium definition is relatively standard and given in Appendix B.1. Given the status externality, the key object of the equilibrium both in the steady state and along the transition path is the endogenous distribution of human capital. This distribution is determined as a fixed point that agents take as given, while their expectations must be consistent with the actual evolution of the human capital distribution. Further details on how we compute the steady state equilibrium and equilibrium transitional dynamics are provided in Appendix B.1.

4 Calibration

We solve the model numerically, as detailed in Appendix B.1, and calibrate it to the cohort of Korean women born between 1970 and 1975 described in Section 2. The calibration proceeds in two steps. First, some parameter values are chosen externally based on direct data analogs, the literature, or simple normalization. Second, the remaining parameters are chosen to match relevant data moments. We also compare the model's predictions along several non-targeted dimensions.

We start with some preliminaries. We set the maximum number of children equal to

three, $N_n = 3$, because the portion of households with more than three offspring is very small.²³ Because fertility is a discrete choice between 0 and 3, it is unnecessary to impose a parametric functional form on $\phi(n)$. Instead, we let it be non-parametric, and assume that $\phi(n) = \phi_n$ and $\phi(0) = 0$. This leads to three parameters, namely $\{\phi_n\}_{n=1}^3$.

We let the discrete distribution for b approximate a log-normal distribution:

$$\log b \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_b^2), \quad (8)$$

with $N_b = 20$. We let the Markov chain for κ approximate an AR(1) process:

$$\log \kappa = \rho_\kappa \log \kappa^p + \varepsilon_\kappa, \quad (9)$$

where $\varepsilon_\kappa \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\kappa^2)$, using [Tauchen \(1986\)](#) with $N_\kappa = 20$. This leads to two parameters— ρ_κ and σ_κ —to be calibrated for the Markov chain. Our quantitative results are barely affected by this choice as long as N_κ is sufficiently large.

4.1 Externally Calibrated Parameters

The parameter γ governs the curvature of the utility function with respect to leisure. We choose $\gamma = 2$ so that the implied intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.5, as is standard in the literature. The parameter λ captures the time costs of children. In our samples from the KLIPS, the average time parents of children under 18 spend with each child is 5.7 hours per week, as detailed in [Appendix A.7](#). Assuming a total weekly time endowment of 100 hours, this leads to $\lambda = 0.041$.²⁴ We consider this time input to be constant. In contrast to the U.S., where more educated parents spend more time with their children ([Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008](#)), we find no meaningful educational gradient in our data, as reported in [Appendix Table A8](#).

For the household equivalence scale $\Lambda(n)$, we use the OECD modified equivalence scale, which assigns 1 to the adult head, 0.5 to an additional adult, and 0.3 to each

²³We include the small fraction of women with four and five children (1.59% in the data) in the three children category. See [Table A1](#) in the Appendix for details.

²⁴A disposable time endowment of 100 hours per week is fairly standard in the literature as it leaves 68 hours for sleep and personal care. We assume children are costly for parents until they become adults, i.e., for 18 years. Since a model period is 25 years, we further adjust the time cost by a factor of 18/25, which then gives $\lambda = 0.041$.

child. Finally, the TFP parameter A is normalized to one.

4.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters

The remaining 11 parameters are $\phi_1, \phi_2, \phi_3, \sigma_\kappa, \nu, \sigma_b, \chi, \theta, \alpha, \rho_\kappa$ and A_h . We calibrate them to match 12 moments from the data described below, specifically by minimizing the sum of squared percentage differences between data and model moments. All data moments are either directly taken from Section 2 or described in Appendix A.

The data moments include the fraction of families with one, two and three or more children. We further include the Gini coefficient of our long-term income as a measure of inequality. To capture the relationship between income and fertility, we include the income elasticity of fertility as well as the fraction of childless families in the poorest quintile. Since spending on education is a key object of interest in our model, we include both average education spending relative to income and the income elasticity of education spending. We also include a measure of the education spillover based on our empirical estimates in Section 2.2. To connect to the reduced-form estimate, we define the benchmark human capital to be the conditional mean among the top 15% of the human capital distribution.²⁵ Finally, intergenerational income elasticity is included as a measure of income persistence across generations. Table 4 reports all data moments as well as the model analogues and the calibrated parameter values.

Since every moment that results from the model is a function of all parameters, there is no one-to-one link between parameters and moments. However, some moments are more informative for particular parameters. It is thus instructive to explain these intuitive links, even though there is no formal identification procedure. The first three parameters in Table 4 govern the utility of having n children. These utility parameters are directly related to the percentages of people with 0, 1, 2 and 3 children in the data. The calibrated values of these parameters are $\phi_1 = 1.39$, $\phi_2 = 2.18$ and $\phi_3 = 2.57$, which are increasing at a decreasing rate with n .

The parameter σ_κ determines the variability of the idiosyncratic ability component

²⁵The benchmark being high socioeconomic status is also in line with the empirical finding that comparison motives are largely upward-looking (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005).

Table 4: Internally Calibrated Parameters and Moments: Model vs. Data

Parameter & Interpretation		Moment	Model	Data
$\phi_1 = 1.39$	} Utility from number of children	Pr(# child = 1)	.176	.196
$\phi_2 = 2.18$		Pr(# child = 2)	.633	.631
$\phi_3 = 2.57$		Pr(# child ≥ 3)	.158	.144
$\sigma_\kappa = .361$	Ability dispersion	Gini income	.266	.263
$\nu = 1.87$	Leisure constant	Avg total hours worked	.290	.302
$\sigma_b = .587$	Preference dispersion	Income elasticity of fertility	.080	.082
$\chi = .078$	Status externality	Education inv. spillover estimate	.038	.039
		Childless in 1st income quintile	.052	.053
$\theta = 1.08$	} HK production technology	Avg investment-income ratio	.110	.092
$\alpha = .668$		Income elasticity of investment	.774	.698
$\rho_\kappa = .376$	Ability persistence	Intergenerat. income elasticity	.330	.320
$A_h = 2.23$	HK scale	Output per capita (normalization)	.958	1.00

Notes: All data moments are based on KLIPS data as described in Section 2 and Appendix A.

in child human capital development. Because this ability shock is an important exogenous source of income heterogeneity in the model, it is largely determined by the Gini coefficient in the data (0.263). Note that our Gini coefficient is somewhat lower than what is typically reported (e.g., by the OECD) because our Gini is based on income averaged over several years rather than annual income, as described in Appendix A.1. The calibrated value of σ_κ is 0.361.

The value parents place on leisure relative to consumption and children is given by the parameter ν . It is pinned down by the average total hours worked in the data (30.2 hours per week or 0.302), as described in Appendix A.7. This value is based on both members of the household and includes both intensive and extensive margins. This leads to a calibrated value of $\nu = 1.87$.

Next, σ_b controls the degree of heterogeneity in preferences. An important reason for having preference heterogeneity is to allow for flexibility in shaping the model-generated relationship between income and fertility. Specifically, a greater variability of b makes the equilibrium fertility-income relationship less positive (or more negative). Our calibrated value of $\sigma_b = 0.587$ allows the model to match the positive income elasticity of fertility of 0.082 from the data almost perfectly.

The strength of the status externality is governed by χ . To discipline this parameter

in our structural model, we use our reduced-form estimate in Section 2.2.²⁶ Among the spillover estimates in Table 3, we choose a conservative value of 0.039 as a target moment. The externality is also relevant for childlessness. Intuitively, a strong status concern leads parents to want high education expenditures, making children costly. For some parents, especially at the bottom of the income distribution, children become so costly that they prefer to have none. Thus, we include the childlessness rate for the bottom quintile as an additional target moment. The calibrated value of $\chi = 0.078$ allows the model to match both the spillover estimate and the childlessness rate of 5.3% quite successfully.

The human capital production function includes two parameters: θ and α . Since θ decreases the marginal return of additional education spending, it reduces the incentive to invest in education, and is therefore useful to match average education spending. The average education spending per child relative to income is 9.2% in the data. The calibrated value of θ is 1.08. In the data, the income elasticity of private education spending is 0.698. This moment is useful for pinning down α because it shapes the marginal product of education investments. Our calibrated α is 0.668.

Note that ρ_κ governs the strength of the exogenous ability transmission from parents to children. This strongly affects how income is correlated across generations. Therefore, our last target statistic is the intergenerational elasticity of income, which is 0.32 in the data. This target moment is the mean value of the estimates based on different age combinations from two generations, as reported in Appendix A.4. This value is very close to its counterpart in the United States, 0.341 (Chetty et al. 2014). The calibrated value of ρ_κ is 0.376.²⁷ Finally, the scale parameter A_h is calibrated to be 2.23 to normalize the steady-state output per capita of one.

²⁶Specifically, for each evaluation of a set of parameter values, we solve the model once again with a change in the \tilde{h}' that are implied by a 10% decrease in x using the human capital technology and the average values among the top 15% human capital children. Using the steady state distribution, we simulate the economy and compute the implied change in the share of x to total expenditures among the bottom 50% income families. We then compute the model-implied spillover effect based on the change in this ratio divided by -10%. This approach of using reduced-form causal estimates for a moment matching calibration in a structural macro model was highlighted in Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).

²⁷If instead we set $\rho_\kappa = 0$ and keep all other parameters as in the baseline calibration, the intergenerational income elasticity would be only 0.104.

Table 5: Fertility and Education Spending across Income Quintiles

		Income quintile					
		All	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
<i>Completed fertility</i>	Data	1.91	1.80	1.91	1.87	1.93	2.03
	Model	1.92	1.78	1.89	1.94	1.99	1.97
<i>Childlessness rate (%)</i>	Data	2.9	5.3	4.0	2.0	1.3	2.0
	Model	3.4	5.2	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.7
<i>Education spending per child rel. to income (%)</i>	Data	9.2	11.2	9.9	9.3	8.7	6.9
	Model	11.0	13.6	12.1	11.2	10.5	10.2

Notes: All data moments are based on KLIPS data as described in Section 2 and Appendix A. Education spending is higher than reported in the last column of Table 2. This is because the income gradient of education expenditure in Table 2 is estimated using individual-level survey data that contain only a subset of total household expenditures on education (e.g., excluding out-of-pocket school tuition), we thus scale the data to align with the mean of a more comprehensive measure of total education expenditures (9.2% of income) based on household-level survey data.


4.3 Non-Targeted Moments

Our calibration strategy targets the income elasticity of fertility and the childlessness rate of the bottom income quintile. But how well does the model match fertility and childlessness across the entire income distribution?

Table 5 shows that the model does a good job of matching the fertility rate across income quintiles in terms of both completed fertility and childlessness rates. Specifically, the model matches the data quite closely in reproducing the average number of children born to parents in the bottom income quintile (around 1.8), as well as the higher average number of children in the richest income quintile, at 2.0. Because we had included the fraction of families with a given number of children as targets, the model unsurprisingly matches the average fertility rate of 1.91 quite well. The childlessness rate across income quintiles in the model is also very similar to the data. Specifically, both in the model and the data, the childlessness rates in the third to fifth income quintiles are quite flat, whereas they are higher in the first income quintile. Overall, the average childlessness rates are both around 3 percent both in the model and in the data.

Table 5 also reports education expenditures per child relative to income in the model

Figure 3: Status Externality and Fertility across Income Quintiles



and in the data. Since we target the overall slope (i.e., the income elasticity of investment), the model successfully generates the decreasing pattern of private education expenditures across income quintiles, as observed in the data. In the model, parents in the top income quintile spend 10% of their income on education per child, whereas those in the bottom quintile spend a substantially larger fraction of their income on education (nearly 14% of total income per child).

5 Sources of Low Fertility

In this section we explore the role the status externality plays for low fertility. We compare it to the alternative hypothesis that social norms on the role of women are the main driver behind low fertility rates.

5.1 Status Externalities in Education

To understand the role of the status externality for fertility choices, we shut it down by setting $\chi = 0$. Figure 3 shows how fertility rates across income quintiles change in the absence of the externality. Two points are worth noting: first, the fertility rate increases across all income quintiles. The aggregate fertility rate, at 2.45 births per woman, is considerably higher than the value of 1.92 in the baseline model with the

Table 6: Effects of the Status Externality across Income Quintiles

		Income quintile				
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
<i>Childlessness rate (%)</i>	Baseline	5.2	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.7
	No Externality	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.2
<i>Education spending per child rel. to income (%)</i>	Baseline	13.6	12.1	11.2	10.5	10.2
	No Externality	5.0	5.1	5.8	5.7	6.3
<i>Change relative to baseline (%)</i>		-63.0	-57.9	-48.4	-45.8	-37.7

status externality. Second, the increase in fertility rates is relatively higher among low-income groups. The income elasticity of fertility takes a negative value in the model without the externality (-0.114), starkly contrasting with the elasticity of 0.080 in the baseline model. This finding is interesting, since the positive relationship between income and fertility disappears and becomes negative when the status externality is removed, bringing it more in line with countries such as the United States (Jones and Tertilt 2008). This result suggests that the status externality may be an important factor behind the positive income elasticity of fertility documented in Section 2.

The top panel of Table 6 also shows that childlessness rates are generally much lower—and increase with income—in the absence of the externality. This is in sharp contrast to the baseline model, which features higher childlessness rates especially among the lowest income households (around 5%). This indicates that the status externality puts more pressure on low-income households in our baseline model, since childlessness falls substantially in the first income quintile when the externality is removed. This mechanism explains the effect of the status externality on the level of fertility as well as the income gradient of fertility.

The bottom panel of Table 6 shows what parental expenditures on private education relative to income would be in an economy without the externality. First, households would generally spend less on private education in the absence of a motivation to catch up with the children of others. This effect is relatively stronger among low-income households, reducing investment per child relative to income by 63%. The reason is that low-income parents in our baseline model invest more aggressively (measured by the percentage of family income spent on private education),

in the hope of bringing their children's status closer to that of the other children.²⁸

5.2 Social Norms about the Role of Women

Myong, Park, and Yi (2021) propose an alternative hypothesis for the low fertility rates in South Korea related to social norms about the role of women. They argue that a social norm about the unequal gender division of childcare coupled with an increase in female wages making such a gendered division more costly, is the main reason behind the low fertility rate. We now explore this hypothesis in our model. While we have no distinction between mothers and fathers in our model and hence cannot speak to the gendered division directly, we can explore this idea as follows. The reason for the social norm to depress fertility is that for some couples (those where the wife has a higher wage than the husband) it would be efficient for the fathers to provide all the childcare, yet, if due to the social norm the mother still does most of it, this comes at a financial cost in terms of lost family income. The higher this lost income, the more expensive are children which lowers demand for children. Myong, Park, and Yi (2021) estimate the cost of the social norm to be 4.3% of the average time cost of raising a child. Removing the social norm thus boils down to reducing the time cost of children, λ , by 4.3% in our model.

Table 7 summarizes the results on fertility and education investment decisions. As suggested by Myong, Park, and Yi (2021), it increases fertility and reduces childlessness. It also reduces education spending. Interestingly, the effects on fertility are much smaller quantitatively in our model with the status externality (a 2.9% increase) than what Myong, Park, and Yi (2021) find (a 11.2% increase). Similarly our childlessness rate falls only by 0.2 percentage points while in their model it decreases from 2.9 to 1.3%. Further, in our model shutting down the social norm increases fertility the most for the lower income quintiles, while in their model the effect is largest for high levels of mother's education. In the data, comparing different cohorts, fertility has fallen the least in the highest income quintile (as shown in Table A7). This is counter to the implication of the model in Myong, Park, and Yi (2021) assuming, as argued by the authors, that the social norm became more rele-

²⁸This effect echoes the empirical findings of Bertrand and Morse (2016), who find that poor people spend a larger share of income on housing, especially when they live close to high earners, which the authors interpret as status-seeking behavior.

Table 7: Effects of Removing Social Norms on Fertility and Education

		Income quintile					
		All	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
<i>Completed fertility</i>	Baseline	1.92	1.78	1.89	1.94	1.99	1.97
	No Social Norm	1.97	1.86	2.00	1.97	2.01	2.01
<i>Childlessness rate (%)</i>	Baseline	3.4	5.2	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.7
	No Social Norm	3.2	4.7	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.8
<i>Education spending per child rel. to income (%)</i>	Baseline	11.0	13.6	12.1	11.2	10.5	10.2
	No Social Norm	10.7	12.9	11.4	10.8	10.4	9.9

Notes: The removal of social norm is captured by an reduction in time costs of children (λ) by 4.3%, the estimate according to [Myong, Park, and Yi \(2021\)](#).


vant over time. Further, when comparing the importance of the social norm with the status externality in our model, we find that turning off the status externality increases fertility by much more than removing the social norm. The former increases fertility by more than half a child, while the latter increase it only by a tenth of that.

There are two further reasons why we believe the high cost of education is more important for understanding recent fertility behaviors in Korea than social norms. The Korea Population, Health and Welfare Association conducted a survey in 2017 to understand the reasons behind the low birth rates.²⁹ The most important reason by far was the financial burden of raising a child (43% of respondents mention this as the main reason, and 64% mention it as one of their top two reasons). The unequal division of housework and childcare towards women was also mentioned in the same survey but not ranked as a main reason by many (only 4.3% of respondents mentioned it as the main reason and only 9.4% as one of the top two reasons). See Appendix A.8 for details.

Secondly, perceptions about the division of housework in the family have changed dramatically over time. Figure 4 shows that between 2008 and 2022 the fraction of 30-39 year olds (the ages during which most births happen in Korea) who think that the wife is mostly responsible for housework has declined from 70% to roughly 20%. By now the majority of Koreans of childbearing age believe that housework should

²⁹The survey is called *Low Fertility Awareness Survey*, see [Korea Population, Health and Welfare Association \(2017\)](#).

Figure 4: Trends on perception about housework division within households



Source: Social Survey ([Statistics Korea 2022](#)). The figure plots the fraction of people aged between 30 and 39 who think that housework should be (i) done entirely or mainly by wife; (ii) shared equally; or (iii) done entirely or mainly by husband.

be shared equally.³⁰ Given this dramatic change, social norms about the gendered division of housework are unlikely to be the main factor behind the lowest low fertility in recent years. Such norms have become much more egalitarian, which should imply, all else equal, that the distortion from the social norm should have declined, not increased, over time.

Of course this does not mean that social norms are irrelevant. Note that the baseline sample for the model estimation in [Myong, Park, and Yi \(2021\)](#) consists of 45-70 years old women in 2015, which means those who were born in 1945-1970, while our analysis focuses on the generation born in 1970-1975, i.e., on a more recent generation. It may well be that the earlier decline in fertility was largely driven by social norms about the gendered division of housework while the more recent decline is more related to status externalities in education.

³⁰The general trend of declining perceptions of the gendered division of housework is robust across all age groups.

6 Pro-natal Transfers and Education Taxes

Like many other countries, the Korean government has implemented various policies to fight falling birth rates. In particular, it initiated *The First Basic Plan on Low Fertility and Aging Society* in 2006 (Hong et al. 2016). In this section, we use our model to investigate the effect of two policies aimed at stimulating the birth rate. First, fertility could be directly stimulated by giving parents cash or in-kind transfers tied to a birth (i.e., a pro-natal transfer). Second, since the status externality leads parents to overinvest in their children's education, a tax on private education could reduce equilibrium education spending, making children cheaper and thus stimulating fertility. In what follows, we investigate the effects of these policies, before turning to the more complicated question of an optimal policy in Section 7. We focus on steady-state comparisons which are useful for gauging the long-run implications. Yet, we also analyze transitional dynamics in Appendix B.4.

6.1 Pro-natal Transfers

Pro-natal transfers are an intuitive way to promote fertility, where a government benefit is tied to the number of children a family has. In Korea, some districts started introducing cash grants for births as early as 2003. By the end of 2011, most districts (229 out of 260) were providing such grants, and these programs are expected to continue to grow in size. Beyond newborns, many countries provide monetary benefits for all children below a certain age. In Germany, for example, a monthly cash transfer of about 200 euros per child (called *Kindergeld*) is given to parents until offspring reach the age of 18. This is essentially a pro-natal transfer as it reduces the cost to parents of having children.

To capture such programs, we add two terms to the household budget constraints:

$$c + xn + T \leq wh(1 - \lambda n - l) + T_n(n), \quad (10)$$

where $T_n(n) > 0$ captures pro-natal transfers. In each period, the government bud-

get is balanced by adjusting lump-sum taxes T to finance government spending:

$$\sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int (T_n(n) - T) F(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p) = 0, \quad (11)$$

where $\tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa$ captures the probability mass of κ_j^p . We consider non-distortionary lump-sum taxes as we want to focus on the issue of the status externality while avoiding another distortion caused by taxes on income or consumption.

We consider a simple function for pro-natal transfers that increases linearly with the number of children: $T_n(n) = \psi n$. To investigate potential nonlinearity in the policy effects, we consider two different levels of ψ : 0.01 and 0.02. A transfer of $\psi = 0.01$ corresponds to a monthly child allowance of 35 USD, or 1.5% of monthly income per child for 18 years.³¹

Table 8 shows that pro-natal transfers clearly increase the fertility rate. For example, with a ψ of 0.01, the new steady-state fertility rate increases by 4.2%. The positive impact on fertility is also observed at the extensive margin: for example, when ψ increases to 0.01 and 0.02, the childlessness rate falls to 3.1% and 2.9%, respectively. However, the required funding also increases rapidly, with 4.5% of output required to sustain a transfer of $\psi = 0.02$. The effects on fertility, meanwhile, are relatively small: the fertility rate only increases from 1.92 to 2.08 (or 8.5%).³²

The fertility effects of pro-natal transfers in our model are in line with recent empirical evidence from Korea. [Hong et al. \(2016\)](#) estimate the causal effect of these transfers in Korea using regional and time variation, finding that a one-time cash bonus of 1,000 USD increases the crude birth rate by 4.4%. More recently, [Kim \(2020\)](#) exploits the same policy changes but uses birth outcomes over a longer time horizon, concluding that a 10% increase in cash transfers raised birth rates by approximately 0.4–0.6%, depending on birth order.³³ These estimates are similar in magnitude to

³¹This value is based on the assumption that annual GDP per capita is 28,732 USD (2015 estimate). Specifically, let M be the monthly payment to each child. The total transfer payments per child until the age of 18 in the data relative to GDP per capita over 25 years is $(M \times 12 \times 18)/(28732 \times 25)$. This corresponds to $\psi/0.958$ in the model. By equating these two, we obtain the relationship between M and ψ . Finally, M divided by 28,732/12 USD gives the fraction relative to monthly income.

³²Interestingly, the effects of the policy are somewhat larger compared to a world without status externalities, as discussed in Appendix B.2.

³³The relatively large estimates of [Hong et al. \(2016\)](#) may partly be caused by a change in the timing of births, making the lower estimates of [Kim \(2020\)](#) more relevant here.

Table 8: Long-run Effects of Pro-natal Transfers and Education Taxes

	Baseline	Pro-natal transfers		Education taxes	
		$\psi = 0.01$	$\psi = 0.02$	$\tau_x = 0.1$	$\tau_x = 0.2$
Fertility rate n	1.92	2.00	2.08	1.97	2.01
(% change)		(4.2%)	(8.5%)	(2.9%)	(4.8%)
Childlessness rate	3.4%	3.1%	2.9%	3.3%	3.3%
Avg x per child/income	11.0%	10.4%	9.9%	8.9%	7.4%
Income elasticity of n	.080	.021	-.021	.027	-.002
Income elasticity of x	.774	.823	.868	.784	.788
Avg labor supply	.290	.288	.286	.282	.275
Avg human capital	3.29	3.24	3.20	3.18	3.11
Output per capita	.958	.938	.918	.901	.860
Gini income	.266	.268	.271	.271	.275
IGE	.330	.327	.326	.313	.296
T/Y		2.1%	4.5%	1.9%	3.2%

Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the percent change relative to the baseline model. T denotes lump-sum taxes in the second and third columns (pro-natal transfer experiments), whereas it denotes lump-sum transfers in the last two columns (education tax experiments).

our model. When we compare a transfer of $\psi = 0.01$ to $\psi = 0.02$, i.e., a 100% increase in pro-natal transfers, the completed fertility rate goes up by 4.1%.

As fertility increases in response to pro-natal transfers, the average spending on private education per child decreases. For instance, with $\psi = 0.02$, parents have more children but invest less per child (education spending per child declines from 11.0% to 9.9% of income). It is also worth noting that the income elasticity of n decreases and that of x increases with larger pro-natal transfers. The rise in fertility among low-income families is greater than among high-income families in response to pro-natal transfers, leading to a larger decrease in per-child education spending in low-income families. Because parents invest less per child, the average human capital and output per capita are lower in the new steady state.³⁴

A pro-natal transfer also leads to a moderate long-run increase in inequality, reflected in a higher Gini coefficient. This is due to the reduced education spending

³⁴We have also considered a means-tested pro-natal transfers which is somewhat more effective in raising fertility, especially among poor parents. Accordingly average labor supply, human capital, and output per capita falls by more. See Appendix B.3 for details.

by poorer parents relative to richer parents when a pro-natal transfer is introduced.

6.2 Private Education Investment Tax

As shown in Section 5, low fertility is partially caused by the status externality, which leads to high education spending. One might therefore consider taxing education. While most countries subsidize rather than tax education, the Korean government has long struggled to reduce the high demand for private education. For instance, in 1980, the government entirely prohibited private education through *hagwons* and private tutoring, among others, although this was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2000. Nonetheless, there remain restrictions on the hours of operation of *hagwons*, as detailed in Section A.3. Similarly, the Chinese government has recently introduced severe regulations in private education industries to fight falling birth rates.³⁵

We now investigate the effects of an education tax in our model. We extend the budget constraint of the household as follows:

$$c + (1 + \tau_x)xn \leq wh(1 - \lambda n - l) + T \quad (12)$$

where $\tau_x \in [0, 1]$ denotes tax on private education investment. We consider two different levels of τ_x : 0.1 and 0.2. Again, we require the government budget to balance in each period, which is achieved through lump-sum transfers T to consumers:

$$\sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int (\tau_x xn - T) F(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p) = 0. \quad (13)$$

The last two columns of Table 8 summarize the results. We find that the education tax is quite powerful in reducing parental investment. Private education expenditures relative to income drop considerably, from 11.0% to 8.9% and 7.4% for education tax rates of 10% and 20%, respectively. A parent's lower demand for quality implies a higher demand for the quantity of children: the fertility rate increases when an education tax is introduced. As parents choose to invest less per child, average

³⁵See "China Bans For-Profit Tutoring In Reforms Aimed At Boosting The Birth Rate" (Forbes, July 24, 2021)

human capital in the long run becomes lower, and parents work less. Together, these lead to lower output per capita in the long run.

In sum, both pro-natal transfers and taxes on private education are found to be effective at raising fertility, although their effects are quantitatively moderate. Yet we also find that these policies necessarily involve intergenerational conflicts, since future generations suffer from lower human capital, which in turn leads to lower output per capita.

7 Optimal Policy

In the previous section, we saw that pro-natal transfers and education taxes affect fertility and education decisions. We have also seen that policies that lower education naturally reduce the human capital of future generations and thus reduce output per capita in the future. But how do these policies impact welfare? What might be the optimal policy? Is there a policy that addresses the distortion caused by the status externality without any negative impact on future generations?

While these are obvious questions to ask, answering them is far from straightforward. In this section, we begin by discussing why this problem is non-trivial in our heterogeneous-agent model with endogenous fertility and then explain how we address this challenge. Then, we investigate the optimal mix of the two policy instruments considered in the previous section.

7.1 Welfare Concepts and the Planning Problem

Externalities generally lead to distortions. In our model, parents do not consider the effect of their education investment on other parents' children. Thus, the marginal private return from education is higher than the marginal social return and parents will overinvest in education. Loosely speaking, the equilibrium allocation will thus not be efficient. One would then like to know what the optimal allocation is that a planner would choose. While this logic seems clear and simple, it entails a number of complications. The notion of Pareto Efficiency is not well-defined in models with endogenous fertility which imply changing sets of people across allocations. Natu-

rally, then, there is no planning problem that recovers the first-best allocation, or, as is often the case, all allocations on the contract curve.

A concept closely related to Pareto Efficiency defined for models with endogenous fertility is *A-Efficiency*, first proposed by [Goloso, Jones, and Tertilt \(2007\)](#). An allocation is considered *A-efficient* if there is no other allocation that is weakly preferred by all people alive in both allocations and strictly preferred by at least one person alive in both allocations. Thus, *A-Efficiency* is a natural modification of Pareto Efficiency, which focuses only on those alive in both allocations whenever comparing two allocations.³⁶ Applying this concept to our context, note that the logic is similar to the pollution example given by [Goloso, Jones, and Tertilt \(2007\)](#). Their example shows that when consumption affects other people negatively, the equilibrium allocation features higher consumption and population levels than optimal. Furthermore, taxes on consumption and children can address the externality and implement the first-best allocation. But how does one find such *A-efficient* allocations? [Goloso, Jones, and Tertilt \(2007\)](#) prove that if the solution to a planning problem that maximizes the weighted sum of utility of the first generation is unique (and all weights are strictly positive), then the allocation is *A-efficient*. In other words, we can recover many different *A-efficient* allocations that maximize the weighted sum of the first generation with varying weights.

An additional consideration is that a large part of welfare gains across policies in heterogeneous agent models typically originate from redistributing resources from the rich to the poor. While welfare gains through redistribution are of interest in a general sense, they are not the focus of our paper. Rather, we are interested in the effects of a particular distortion.³⁷ To isolate the welfare implications of the distortion from redistributive concerns, we use Negishi weights. Negishi weights put a greater weight on rich people (in our case, those with high human capital) so that in an economy without distortions the planning problem simply recovers the equilibrium allocation.³⁸ Finally, rather than computing the unconstrained optimum,

³⁶This concept ignores the “views” of additional people whenever one allocation has a higher fertility rate and ignores the “views” of those that do not come into existence when considering an alternative allocation with a smaller population. Since preferences of non-existing people are hard to define and impossible to measure, simply ignoring them is a pragmatic way to move forward.

³⁷Welfare gains through redistribution can be easily achieved in heterogeneous agent models. Yet these “welfare gains” are usually not Pareto-improving, since the rich are made worse off, unless one takes a veil-of-ignorance perspective. See [Davila et al. \(2012\)](#) for further discussion.

³⁸Negishi weights are frequently used in environmental economics ([Nordhaus and Yang 1996](#)).

we follow the Ramsey tradition and allow the planner to use only a certain set of instruments, namely education taxes and pro-natal transfers.³⁹

With these preliminary considerations, let us now define a planning problem for our model. The planner maximizes the Negishi-weighted sum of the utility of the initial generation subject to the allocation being implementable as an equilibrium with education taxes and pro-natal transfers.⁴⁰ In each period following the initial reform period, we constrain the planner to impose the same taxes and transfers on everyone, and to balance the government budget constraint. The planner considers utilities along the transition path, rather than comparing steady states.⁴¹ The baseline exercise considers permanent policy changes as in the previous section, but we also consider temporary policy changes, as shown in Appendix B.8. For a formal definition of the planning problem, see Appendix B.5.

7.2 Optimal Policy Results

We find that the optimal policy—that maximizes the Ramsey planning problem as described above—is a 21.6% education tax and moderate cash transfers with a ψ of 0.0178. This amounts to a monthly cash transfer of 62 USD (2.6% of average income) for 18 years, according to the conversion of ψ into the monthly child allowance in Section 6.1. To verify that the planner’s problem is well-behaved, we plot the utility of the planner for each instrument separately in Appendix B.7: Figure A9 shows that the value varies smoothly in each policy instrument individually. Relative to the baseline economy, the optimal policy increases the Negishi-weighted average

In contrast, the quantitative macroeconomics literature typically uses equal weights, mixing welfare gains from redistribution and those arising from correcting distortions. Notable exceptions include Domeij and Klein (2013), Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017), and Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2020).

³⁹The first-best planning allocations that maximize the welfare of the first generation are difficult to compute in our model due to the discrete choice of fertility. Specifically, since no tractable optimality condition can be derived and human capital is a continuous variable, it requires the planner to compare an infinite number of combinations of fertility choices across heterogeneous agents.

⁴⁰Appendix B.6 provides details about how we construct the Negishi weights. To check whether our Negishi weights are constructed correctly, we also solved the same planning problem for a modified economy without externality feedback, as described in Appendix B.2. With the modified economy, we find that the optimal τ_x and ψ are zero. This shows that our attempt to separate the distortion from redistributive concerns was successful.

⁴¹Simply comparing steady states with different policies would give misleading results, since this would compare allocations with different initial levels of human capital, ignoring the transition to reach the new level of human capital.

Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects of the Optimal Policy on the First Generation


Average		Income quintile					All
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Fertility, n	Baseline	1.78	1.89	1.94	1.99	1.97	1.92
	Optimal	2.19	2.19	2.12	2.10	2.03	2.12
	% change	+23.1	+15.6	+9.1	+5.4	+2.8	+10.8
Childlessness rate (%)	Baseline	5.2	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.7	3.4
	Optimal	2.3	2.2	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.7
	p.p. change	-2.9	-0.7	-0.2	-0.1	+0.3	-0.7
Investment per child, x (if $n > 0$)	Baseline	.061	.080	.096	.115	.175	.106
	Optimal	.033	.046	.057	.072	.113	.064
	% change	-45.6	-42.9	-40.3	-37.6	-35.6	-39.3

utility of the first generation by 0.0126. To interpret the size of the welfare gain, we compute the change in consumption of the average agent with two children in the baseline equilibrium that is needed to achieve the same utility gain. We find that this corresponds to a 1.2% increase in lifetime consumption. In other words, noticeable welfare gains for the first generation are possible through the introduction of a sizeable education tax and a moderate pro-natal transfer.

Table 9 shows the effect of the policy on the first generation and how the resulting allocation differs from the baseline equilibrium. Under the optimal policy, average fertility is higher by 10.8%, the childlessness rate is reduced by more than half a percentage point, and educational investments decrease by 39%. The effects are heterogeneous along the income distribution. Fertility increases the most (23%) for the poorest quintile and the least (3%) for the richest quintile. This is intuitive, since it is the poor who are most affected by the externality. Similarly, the childlessness rate decreases the most for the poorest quintile and very little for the top quintile. Education spending declines the most for the poorer quintiles, but the gradient is relatively less steep here, falling between 36% and 46% for all quintiles.

How does the optimal policy affect future generations? Figure 5 shows the transitional dynamics of key variables to the new steady state with the optimal policy that is introduced unexpectedly and permanently in period 1. As discussed above, the optimal policy increases the fertility rate and decreases education spending. As a result, human capital and output decrease gradually over time. However, parents

Figure 5: Transition Equilibrium Under the Optimal Policy



Notes: The optimal policy reform is introduced unexpectedly and permanently in period 1. Welfare is measured by Negishi-weighted average utility. A model period corresponds to 25 years.

(the first generation) benefit from the optimal policy by enjoying more leisure and consumption. The last panel shows that the welfare of the first generation increases, while all future generations experience lower average utilities. Thus, future generations could be largely hurt by the introduction of the optimal policy, at least if measured by average utility.⁴² The reason for this is twofold. First, in our model, only the parents—i.e., not the children—face the human capital externality. Secondly, our model considers education to be truly productive. If either of these two assumptions was changed, it should be possible to construct allocations that truly benefit every generation. To understand why, consider a status externality that leads parents to invest in improving signals for their children without truly educating them more. For example, a large part of preparation for a national entrance exam might only improve test-taking skills without increasing children’s knowledge and human capital. In such cases, less education spending will not lower the human capital of children and, accordingly, not harm the welfare of the children.⁴³ Alternatively, suppose chil-

⁴²The same is still true, though less pronounced, in the case of a temporary policy, see Figure A10 in Appendix B.8.

⁴³The signaling value of education, which is costly but does not necessarily improve productivity, was first studied by Spence (1973). Several authors have formalized the point that investment into

dren faced the same externality as the parents, i.e., they cared about consumption relative to their peers, similar to the original pollution example in [Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt \(2007\)](#) where parents and children suffered from pollution in the same way. In such a world, it should be possible to construct a dominating allocation with lower education and consumption for future generations that nevertheless improves their welfare. Finally, note that the population size of future generations becomes larger under the policy that maximizes the first generation's welfare. Alternative views of the optimal population problem ([Dasgupta 1969](#); [de la Croix and Doepke 2021](#)) could put weights on population size per se (something that our concept of \mathcal{A} -efficiency is silent on), which may offset the lower average utility of future generations.

8 Tournament Model

We have modeled status concerns as a pure utility externality. A question is whether there is a deeper cause behind such an externality. One possibility is that status concerns capture capacity constraints in the national education system in a reduced form way. If children compete for a limited number of high-quality universities, parents will have a strong incentive to invest in private education to improve their children's chance to get in (e.g., a rug-rat race as noted by [Ramey and Ramey \(2010\)](#)).

We now investigate this idea by changing the model as follows. Let $\Pi(h'; \tilde{h}')$ denote the probability of getting into college. It is a function of own human capital but also others' human capital, since if others invest more, the cut-off for getting in must be higher with limited slots. We change the parental utility function so that parents derive utility specifically from their children getting into college,

$$U(c, l, n, h', \tilde{h}') = b \log \left(\frac{c}{\Lambda(n)} \right) + \nu \frac{l^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \phi(n) \Pi(h'; \tilde{h}'). \quad (14)$$

There are two key features required for Π . First, the probability of going to college increases with greater human capital: $\partial \Pi / \partial h' > 0$. Second, a greater h' makes it more difficult for others to get into college. To capture this externality, an aggregate

costly signals out of status concerns can lead to inefficient investments and even poverty; see, for example, [Ireland \(1998\)](#) and [Moav and Neeman \(2012\)](#).

statistic of human capital \tilde{h}' enters negatively: $\partial\Pi/\partial\tilde{h}' < 0$. Note that the second property works similarly to the status externality in our baseline model. However, a key difference is that we now explicitly incorporate the possibility that some families might face very low returns to private education investments if their children have human capital that is sufficiently below from some threshold level required for college entrance.⁴⁴ To do so, we consider the following functional form for Π :

$$\Pi(h'; \tilde{h}') = \max\{0, 1 - e^{-\iota_2(h' + \iota_0 - \iota_1\tilde{h}')}\}. \quad (15)$$

This function permits the possibility of having a zero chance to go to college for low human capital, which is shaped by ι_0 . The speed at which the probability increases with human capital is controlled by ι_2 . It thus determines the equilibrium share of college graduates. The importance of relative performance for getting into college is governed by ι_1 , similar to χ in our status externality model. Finally, the function approaches one asymptotically so that children with high enough human capital are essentially guaranteed a college slot. To calibrate this modified model we add the share of college graduates as a new data target. The share of tertiary-educated 25-34 year-olds was 69% in 2021.⁴⁵ We keep the other target moments as in the status externality model.⁴⁶ Generally, the tournament model also fits the data well, as shown in Appendix Table A13.

As expected, the tournament model generates a portion of people who face a zero probability of their child going to college.⁴⁷ This is concentrated among the poorer parents. One could thus expect policies to affect parents along the income distribution quite differently from our status externality model. In particular, if poor parents' children have no intention to attend college in any case, then the general equilibrium effect that a policy has on \tilde{h} may not be operative for them. This could lead to policy affecting parents along the income distribution in opposite ways from

⁴⁴While we do not model the threshold explicitly, we later verify in the quantitative model that the total number of children in college indeed stays roughly constant in response to policy changes. Thus, our formulation captures well the idea of college slot scarcity.

⁴⁵See Education at a Glance 2022: OECD Indicators.

⁴⁶ \tilde{h}' is set to be the top 15% average because we still target the investment spillover estimate based on the top 15% as in the status externality model. Since we added two new parameters but only one new moment, the model is now exactly identified.

⁴⁷Recall that parents do not know their children's ability with certainty before they make the fertility choice. Thus, it is possible to have kids with zero chance of going to college. A full histogram of college probabilities is shown in Figure A14 in Appendix B.9.

Table 10: Long-run Effects of Pro-natal Transfers and Education Taxes: Tournament Model

	Baseline	Pro-natal transfers		Education taxes	
		$\psi = 0.01$	$\psi = 0.02$	$\tau_x = 0.1$	$\tau_x = 0.2$
Fertility rate n	1.90	1.97	2.08	1.89	1.88
(% change)		(4.1%)	(9.5%)	(-0.5%)	(-1.0%)
Childlessness rate	2.6%	1.9%	1.3%	2.8%	2.8%
Avg x per child/income	9.7%	9.4%	9.1%	8.7%	7.9%
Income elasticity of n	.083	.020	-.053	.074	.067
Income elasticity of x	.675	.738	.804	.698	.718
Avg labor supply	.308	.307	.305	.304	.300
Avg human capital	3.07	3.01	2.94	2.96	2.87
Output per capita	.939	.919	.892	.897	.859
Gini income	.223	.228	.236	.231	.240
IGE	.308	.322	.335	.310	.311
T/Y		2.1%	4.7%	1.7%	3.0%

Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the percent change relative to the baseline model. T denotes lump-sum taxes in the second and third columns (pro-natal transfer experiments), whereas it denotes lump-sum transfers in the last two columns (education tax experiments).

the main model. We now explore this possibility quantitatively.

Table 10 is the analog of Table 8 from our status externality model. While the effect of pro-natal transfers is very similar, the effect of education taxes is quite different. While in the status externality model fertility increased with the policy, it is hardly affected in the tournament model. The reason is that an education tax always has two effects: it lowers the externality but it also makes education more expensive. In the tournament model the two effects roughly cancel out so that fertility does not change much. Further, we find that the expected effect that poorer parents are less responsive to an education tax does not materialize. Rather, the policy does cause parents in the poorest quintile to reduce education spending by the most (31%) and in the richest quintile the least (23%). The reason is that given the high college rate in Korea, even among the poorest quintile of parents a large share of children do attend college. So while some parents are below a threshold level that makes them inelastic to policy, this is only a small fraction of parents even within the poorest quintile and hence quantitatively not important.

Table 11: Heterogeneous Effects of the Optimal Policy on the First Generation: Tournament Model

Average		Income quintile					All
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Fertility, n	Baseline	1.71	1.93	1.98	1.97	1.87	1.90
	Optimal	2.30	2.18	2.14	2.06	1.93	2.12
	% change	+34.1	+13.0	+7.9	+4.3	+2.9	+11.8
Childlessness rate (%)	Baseline	5.5	1.9	1.4	1.6	2.6	2.6
	Optimal	0.5	0.9	1.1	1.1	2.4	1.2
	p.p. change	-5.0	-1.0	-0.3	-0.5	-0.2	-1.4
Investment per child, x (if $n > 0$)	Baseline	.055	.081	.094	.106	.120	.091
	Optimal	.030	.048	.058	.067	.078	.056
	% change	-46.0	-40.3	-37.8	-36.2	-35.0	-38.4
No. of children going to college	Baseline	1.15	1.45	1.54	1.55	1.52	1.44
	Optimal	1.30	1.48	1.56	1.58	1.55	1.49
	% change	+12.9	+1.5	+1.2	+1.8	+1.5	+3.3

Next we compare optimal policies in the two model versions. Sticking to the same set of instruments as before, we find that the optimal intervention is larger in the tournament model which requires an education tax $\tau_x = 36.3\%$ and a pro-natal transfer $\psi = 0.0244$ (compared to 21.6% and 0.0178 in the status externality model, respectively). The welfare benefit of the optimal policy on the first generation is also slightly higher than in the status externality model. The heterogeneous effects on the first generation are quite similar as shown in Table 11. In particular, as before, the investment per child does decrease the most for the poorest quintile and the slope is quite similar compared to Table 9. Similarly, fertility increases the most for the poorest quintile and the least for the richest quintile.

Table 11 also shows how the pattern of college enrollment changes. Since fertility changes with policy which also affects the chance to get into college, we report the number of children per family that go to college rather than the probability. The table confirms that, as desired, the total number of children per family in college remains roughly the same. However, families along the income distribution react differently. With the optimal policy in place, poorer families on average send more

children to college, while for the richest quintile hardly anything changes.⁴⁸

Overall, we conclude that even if the status externality was ultimately caused by the scarcity of college slots, the policy implications would remain essentially the same in a setting like Korea where the share of the college-educated is very high.

9 Conclusion

In this paper, we present a heterogeneous-agent model of endogenous fertility with a concern for the relative quality of children. Our model enriches the standard quality-quantity model and can account for various cross-sectional patterns of fertility and education investment in Korea. In our model, the absence of a status externality leads to a 28% higher fertility rate, driven in particular by low-income families.

We investigate the transition of economic variables and the welfare of different generations after various policy reforms. In the literature, the effect of pro-natal policies on fertility is typically analyzed empirically. Our approach uses a dynamic equilibrium model framework, which allows us to study the dynamic effect on other variables over time and the welfare of different generations. This is important because the distortion from the status externality complicates the problem by affecting various decisions such as education investment and labor supply in addition to fertility decisions. This, in turn, leads to differential benefits for different generations following policy reforms. Indeed, we find that the optimal policy from the perspective of the current generation, which consist of pro-natal transfers and education taxes, may lead to undesirable outcomes for future generations and could cause a conflict between current and future generations. In addition, our policy experiments reveal the heterogeneous effects of policy reforms along the income distribution. For instance, the optimal policy disproportionately increases fertility and decreases education investment among low-income households.

⁴⁸Figure A14 (Panel B) shows the college probability as a function of child human capital. Compared to the baseline equilibrium, the threshold below which children have a zero probability moves to the left under the optimal policy and all children with human capital above the threshold have now a slightly higher probability. Yet in equilibrium average human capital falls leading to lower college enrolment. This is undone with the higher fertility rate, with some of the additional children filling up the freed up college slots.

Our approach and findings should apply beyond Korea. Other East Asian countries, most notably China, Singapore and Taiwan, similarly suffer from total fertility rates far below the replacement level along with high demands for private education. Concerns about relative education are often mentioned there as well. Even in the United States, with highly competitive university admissions (necessarily) based on relative achievements, our mechanism may apply to some extent.

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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION: APPENDIX

A Data Appendix

A.1 Preliminaries

We use the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) data to document fertility and educational spending across households. The KLIPS is a longitudinal survey of representative samples of Korean households and individuals. The survey has been conducted annually since 1998 on a sample of 5,000 households and members of the households. The data contains a rich variety of information including household demographics, education, labor market mobility, income, fertility, etc. We adjust income for inflation using CPI. The unit of income is 10,000 Korean Won (KRW), which is similar to 9 USD. We use the data up to the 20th survey which was conducted in 2017.

As in [Jones and Tertilt \(2008\)](#), we use a cohort-based approach. The baseline results focus on the women born in between 1970 and 1975.⁴⁹ Specifically, we include households in which the woman's age is between 40 to 43 and there are at least three observations within this age band. Also, we include only married or cohabiting couples in the analysis because single women are more likely to have lower fertility and lower family income than couples. The number of two-adult households satisfying all the required conditions is 756. We also provide the results including both singles and couples below for sensitivity.

Completed fertility is the number of children ever born to a woman, and includes both intensive and extensive margins of fertility. The extensive margin of fertility is whether to have any child or not. The intensive margin is about the number of children conditional on having at least one child. Table [A1](#) shows the proportion of households, satisfying all the above requirements, with different numbers of children. The childlessness rate is 2.9%. Among parents who decide to have at least

⁴⁹The KLIPS used to represent the urban households in South Korea until 2008. In 2009, new households are added so that it can represent the whole population. Therefore, our empirical results are based on the data from 2009 which represent the whole population. We check robustness using the earlier cohort of 1961-1966 from the data before 2009.

Table A1: The Distribution of the Number of Children

Number of children	0	1	2	3	4	5
Proportion (%)	2.91	19.58	63.10	12.83	1.46	0.13

Notes: We calculate the proportion of households (married or cohabiting couples) using completed fertility of women born between 1970 and 1975.


one child, the proportion of parents with two children is the highest at 63.1%. Note that we include the small fraction of women with four and five children (1.59% in the data) in the three children category in the quantitative analysis. We further look into the relationship between income and fertility along both intensive and extensive margins.

To measure permanent household income, we utilize the longitudinal feature of the data by taking long term averages ([Chetty et al. 2014](#)). Specifically, we use the average income of households in which the woman's age is between 40 to 43. Our income measure is family income that combines labor income from both members of couples as well as capital income, but excludes income from social insurance and transfers. The Gini coefficient from our measure of long-term average income is 0.263.

A.2 Education Expenditures by Income and Child's Age

The KLIPS has two different types of questions regarding education in both the individual-level survey data and household-level survey data. First, the individual-level survey asks about per-child spending on private education, such as cram schools, for each child since Wave 3. Although this question excludes household expenditures on public education (e.g., tuitions), this is advantageous because we can observe the characteristics of the child which the money is spent on. We use this individual-level survey question to investigate the cross-sectional relationship between expenditures on private education and income. Second, the household-level survey also asks about total household-level expenditures on both private and public education since Wave 1. This gives a very comprehensive measure of out-of-pocket educational spending. However, it is hard to control for each child's charac-

Figure A1: Expenditures on Private Education by Income and Education Stage



teristics when there are multiple children in a household. Thus, we use this information to measure per-child spending on education relative to household income.

Figure A1 shows the relationship between the log of average education expenditures on private education per child and the log of average income for each income quintile and for each education stage. The slope implies the income elasticity of demand for private education increases as children go to the next level of school: 0.57 for pre-school, 0.63 for elementary school, 0.77 for middle school, and 1.03 for high school. Because education costs also change as children go to the next level of school, we calculate the weighted average expenditures across different education stages using the number of years spent in each education stage as the weight. Specifically, we first calculate the education-stage-specific average spending for the given income quintile and education stage, and then averaging across different education stages weighted by the number of years spent in each education stage. The weighted average income elasticity of demand for private education is 0.698 and is used for calibration.

Tables A2 and A3 show the level of private education spending per child conditional on positive spending (intensive margin) and the fraction of households with no private education spending (extensive margin), respectively, by income quintile and education stages. The last column shows the average expenditures across different education stages weighted by the number of years spent in each education stage. These tables show that all income groups increase spending from elementary

Table A2: Level of Monthly Private Education Spending (10,000 Won)

Income quintile	Pre-school	Elementary school	Middle school	High school	Weighted average
1st	21.5	19.3	27.5	31.2	23.3
2nd	23.3	24.1	31.3	33.2	26.4
3rd	26.2	29.4	34.9	42.5	31.1
4th	29.4	32.2	42.2	49.6	35.5
5th	39.6	40.5	51.0	59.9	44.9

Notes: The table shows the level of monthly education spending among those spending non-zero amounts.


Table A3: Fraction of Households with No Private Education Spending (%)

Income quintile	Pre-school	Elementary school	Middle school	High school	Weighted average
1st	36.7	23.5	48.7	69.8	39.7
2nd	27.5	9.3	20.6	45.0	23.4
3rd	25.7	6.7	17.4	39.3	20.5
4th	21.4	3.7	12.0	29.0	15.5
5th	18.0	2.2	7.0	18.0	11.2

to high school, conditional on participating in private education. It is also noteworthy that more households drop out of private education as their children enter the following education stage after elementary school, and this pattern is observed for all income groups.

Figure A2 shows the average monthly education expenditures per child from birth to age 24 and their shares relative to income. We use households with one child to plot this figure because we want to focus on the variation by child's age. The vertical lines indicate the typical ages at which children enter the next level of school in Korea. Note that the education expenditures increase rapidly, reaching 10% of income, before children enter elementary school. Then, it continually increases at a lower speed until children graduate from high school. The peak is at age 17 when children is in the second year in high school and the amount is around 500,000 KRW (similar to 450 USD) per month. The share of education expenditure in income has a similar shape but jumps when children enter high school. The share drops from the

Figure A2: Household Education Expenditures by Child Age



Notes: This figure shows the total education expenditures on both private and public education per child for 25 years from age 0 to 24 and their shares in household income.

third year in college. Expenditures on private education for college students would be low but tuition is much higher. This implies that many Korean parents provide financial supports for their children's college tuition though their supports decrease rapidly from the third year in college.⁵⁰

In Section 4, we use the fraction of total life-time education spending per child in income to calibrate our model. The life-time spending per child for 25 years from birth to age 24 is 9.2% of income. To obtain this, we first sum the education expenditures and incomes separately across ages for 25 years and then divide the sum of expenditures with the sum of incomes (after-tax income).

A.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation of Spillovers in Private Education Choice

The 2SLS estimation, Equations (1)–(2), is based on the average regional spending in private education calculated from the Private Education Expenditures Survey (PEES) microdata, and our baseline household-level samples from KLIPS. A very small number of samples remain in our baseline KLIPS data for some provinces once

⁵⁰The rapid drop can be related to the conscription system in Korea. Many male students go to the army after finishing their second year in college.

we disaggregate them at the province level. Therefore, we calculate the province-level average variables externally from PEES, which provides richer information at the disaggregated level. Although PEES contains high-quality information on private education spending, income is available only as a categorical variable (eight income categories). Thus, we merge the two data sets for this analysis. All nominal variables are adjusted for inflation using CPI.

We construct the curfew indicators based on the ordinances of each province we collect manually. When the curfew was implemented in the middle of a year, the curfew indicator is set to one for that year. The main results do not change considerably when we allow the indicators to incorporate the intensity using the exact implementation time during the year. Although there are additional variations in the curfews before 2009, we utilize them only from 2009 because the PEES regional information is only available since 2009 (e.g., see also [Choi and Choi \(2016\)](#)). As the final curfew variations occur in 2013, we choose the final year 2015 to capture their potential lingering effects.

Our estimation focuses on parents with middle school students. Elementary school students usually finish school before 3 pm and *hagwon* before dinner. Therefore, the curfews are much less likely to bind for elementary school students. Although a significant portion of high school students do attend *hagwons* late at night ([Choi and Cho 2016](#)), curfews for high school students feature much less variations, as shown in Figure A3. For example, most provinces maintain a relatively weak curfew at 12 p.m. for the entire periods. Therefore, these are not suitable for us to use as instruments in the first stage, yielding the weak instrument issue.

For the exclusion restriction of instrumental variables, it is important that our baseline samples are not directly affected by the curfew changes. In other words, we should consider families with children unlikely to attend *hagwons* after 10 p.m. Since we do not have their time diary information in our KLIPS samples, we indirectly check if our samples, chosen as those whose income is below the median (*low income*) or those families where both parents have at most a high school degree (*low education*), are generally those who spend significantly less in private education.

Specifically, we compute how much less families with low socioeconomic status (SES) spend on private education per child, relative to everyone else. We focus on the main sample of families with middle school-aged children. Taking simple

Figure A3: Curfews across Province over Time

Panel A. Middle School										
Province	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Seoul	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Busan	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Daegu	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Daejeon	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Incheon	12	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Gwangju	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Ulsan	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Gyeonggi	11	11	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Gangwon	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Chungbuk	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Chungnam	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Jeonbuk	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Jeonnam	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Gyeongbuk	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Gyeongnam	12	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11
Jeju	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

Panel B. High School										
Province	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Seoul	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Busan	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Daegu	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Daejeon	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Incheon	12	12	12	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Gwangju	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Ulsan	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Gyeonggi	12	12	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Gangwon	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Chungbuk	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Chungnam	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Jeonbuk	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
Jeonnam	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Gyeongbuk	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Gyeongnam	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
Jeju	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12

averages on monthly private education spending per child over 2000–2009, we find that families with low income spend 141,788 KRW, which is substantially lower than 292,114 KRW by families who are not categorized as low income. Similarly, when we use the definition of low SES families by parental education, the difference is similarly considerable: 170,164 KRW (low education) versus 323,283 KRW (not low education).

Since the above mean differences may partially reflect provincial income differences, Table A4 reports the coefficient of each low SES dummy variable from a separate equation where we regress private education spending per child on the low SES dummy (either low income or low education) and province fixed effects. The results show that the above mean differences by parental SES remain quantitatively similar.

Table A4: Private Education Spending by Parental Socioeconomic Status (SES), Controlling for Province Fixed-Effects

(Unit: 1,000 KRW)	(1)	(2)
Low SES indicator	-144	-146
s.e.	(17.4)	(20.8)
Definition of Low SES	Income	Education
Province FE	Yes	Yes
Obs.	5,138	
Avg. Monthly Spending per Child	231	


Notes: Reported values are the coefficient estimates from a regression equation where the dependent variable is monthly private education spending per child at the household-level in 1,000 KRW. We regress this on the indicator variable for either "low income" or "low education" while controlling for province fixed effects over 2000–2009. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. As of 2022, 1,200 KRW corresponds approximately to 1 USD.

Additionally, we find a significant positive relationship between the father's income and the student's last *hagwon* attendance time using the Korean Time Use Survey (KTUS) conducted in 2009. Because the KTUS microdata provide only eleven income categories, we calculate the average income of fathers in the KLIPS data corresponding to the KTUS income categories and impute these average values to the KTUS households. Then, we calculate the average income for each *hagwon* attending time from 4 p.m. to midnight, based on the *last attendance time*. Panel A of Figure A4 shows that the father's income is significantly higher for students attending *hagwons* late. Panel B shows the fraction of students for each last attendance time.⁵¹ Only around 15% of students attend *hagwons* at 10 p.m. or later. Panels C and D show the fraction of students divided by father's income (low income: bottom 6 income categories among eleven) and parents' education (low education: both parents at most a high school degree). Notably, the relative shares of high-income and high-education families increase as students attend *hagwons* late.

We also use the PEES microdata to inspect if curfew adoptions across provinces were plausibly exogenous. Specifically, we check the trend of private education spending

⁵¹The total sum is around 68% as 32% of students do not attend *hagwons*.

Figure A4: Students' Last *Hagwon* Attendance Time



using the following regression:


$$\ln E_{ist} = \sum_{t \neq 2009} \alpha_t \mathcal{Y}_t + \sum_{t \neq 2009} \eta_t (T_s \times \mathcal{Y}_t) + \xi_s + \epsilon_{ist} \quad (\text{A1})$$

where $\ln E_{ist}$ is the log of (real) average private education expenditures per child for household i in province s and year t . \mathcal{Y}_t is the year dummies. \mathcal{Y}_{2009} is excluded as the base year. T_s is the indicator for provinces with curfew changes from 2011 to 2013 (*treatment group*). The other group of provinces (*control group*) had not experienced curfew changes since 2009. ξ_s is the province fixed effect.⁵²

Figure A5 illustrates the average log private education expenditures for the two groups of provinces as specified in Equation (A1): Panel A for all households, Panel B for the bottom 50% income households, Panel C for the top 50% income house-

⁵²The regression excludes one province, Daejeon, where the curfew changed in 2009, the start year of the analysis window. Including Daejeon does not make a significant change.

Figure A5: Curfew Changes and Trends in Private Education Spending



Notes: The lines depict the average log private education expenditures for the treatment (with a curfew change since 2011) and control groups (with no curfew change) as specified in Equation (A1). The shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

holds, and Panel D for the top 15% income households.⁵³ Panel A shows that pre-trends were not distinguishable between the two groups, which means that the parallel-trend assumption is satisfied. Panel B shows no significant differences in the spending of low-income households between the two groups. Panels C and D show significant differences in spending between the two groups after 2011 for high-income consumers, with a larger difference among the top 15% income group.

In addition, we re-estimate the IV regression using different income groups to construct the regional average variable E_{st} . Since we consider the impact on the bottom

⁵³We define households in the bottom four categories as low-income households. These households are roughly half of all households. The top two income categories account for around 15% of all households. Note that when we focus only on the top income category, the direct effect becomes smaller and less significant.

Table A5: First-stage F-statistics with Different Groups for Regional Spending E_{st}

E_{st} based on	Low Income		Low Education	
Top 5%	9.37	2.11	11.12	2.37
Top 15%	16.59	4.44	20.01	5.18
Top 50%	6.90	3.25	6.85	3.15
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table shows F-statistics of the first stage in the IV regression, using different groups to construct the regional spending variable E_{st} . The second and fourth columns are based on the regression without year fixed effect, and the third and fifth columns are based on the regression with year fixed effects.

half, we only consider the following top income groups to circumvent the reflection problem: top 5%, top 15%, and top 50%. The first-stage F-statistics are given in Table A5. A large value of F-statistic indicates the relevance of our instruments. As F-statistics are the largest for the top 15% group, we use the top 15% income households in the PEES microdata to construct the regional average private education spending (E_{st}) for the IV regression.

There are also recent empirical studies related to our findings. These papers adopt different empirical strategies and find a positive peer effect on parents' investment. For example, [Kim, Jang, and Kim \(2022\)](#) and [Guo and Qu \(2022\)](#) use the random class assignment of students within schools in Korea and China, respectively. [Agostinelli \(2018\)](#) uses changes in racial composition across cohorts within a school in the United States.

A.4 Intergenerational Persistence

To estimate the intergenerational persistence of income between parents and children, we use our samples from the KLIPS data. Specifically, we first select households with information on labor earnings (including self-employed) for both parents and children in working ages. We focus on the average income of fathers aged 39 to 44 and that of children aged 30 to 35. We include households only when they have at least two observations for each person in the target ages. The number of matches increases as the gap in the target age bands for fathers and children getting apart.

Table A6: Intergenerational Elasticity of Earnings

	Father's age		
	39-42	40-43	41-44
Child's age			
30-33	0.28	0.25	0.23
31-34	0.36	0.24	0.23
32-35	0.41	0.53	0.35

Notes: This table shows the estimated intergenerational earnings persistence when ages of fathers and children vary.

However, to get a better measure of the intergenerational earnings persistence, it is better to reduce the gap in target age bands. We select the current age bands for fathers and children to balance these two factors. Also, we can mitigate the life-cycle bias by focusing on the narrow target ages for parents and children ([Haider and Solon 2006](#)). Among parents, we use father's earnings because mother's working status is affected more by other factors than human capital, such as childbearing. This is standard in the empirical literature on intergenerational mobility ([Solon 1999](#)). Then, we regress the log income of children on the log income of father. The estimates depend on the target ages of fathers and children. Table A6 in Appendix shows that the estimated elasticity ranges from 0.2 to 0.5. We take the simple mean of the estimates, 0.33, for calibration. This value is quite close to the estimates from the United States ([Chetty et al. 2014](#)).

A.5 Fertility by Cohorts

Our baseline results focus on the women born between 1970 and 1975. Since the fertility rate has been decreasing quickly in Korea, we check how the relationship between fertility and income has been changed. Table A7 shows the number of children and childlessness rate for the recent cohorts (women born in 1970-75) and the earlier cohorts (women born in 1961-66). Overall, the number of children is higher, and the childlessness rate is lower for the earlier cohorts. Next, we find that the positive slope between the number of children and income is slightly steeper for recent cohorts, as compared to the earlier cohorts. For example, the estimated income elas-

Table A7: Fertility and Income (Couples Only)

Income quintile	Number of children		Childlessness rate (%)	
	1970-75	1961-66	1970-75	1961-66
1th	1.80	1.99	5.26	3.17
2nd	1.91	1.97	3.97	0.79
3rd	1.87	2.06	1.99	0.79
4th	1.93	2.13	1.32	0.00
5th	2.03	2.08	1.99	0.01

Notes: This table shows the average fertility rate, the childlessness rate in each income quintile for each cohort group excluding single households.


tivity of fertility is 0.082 from our recent baseline cohort samples, whereas it is 0.041 in these earlier cohorts. Finally, the last two columns of Table A7 show that the relationship between fertility and childlessness rates is still negative also for the earlier cohorts although the overall childlessness rate was even lower at 1.1% compared to 2.9% for the recent cohorts.

A.6 Income and Fertility for Singles and Couples

As explained in Section 2, our main analysis focuses on the couples, excluding singles such as widowed, divorced, separated, and never married females. Among our target cohorts who answer the question about marriage status in KLIPS, there is no never-married women whose ages are in between 40 and 43. However, there are missing answers, and we define these women as singles if they do not have information about spouse such as age. If they have information about spouses, we define they are couples. Among the target households, the portion of single women is around 8%. The portion of never-married women in Korea is in an increasing trend especially for young women in their 30s. These young women are not included in our analysis because they are still in their childbearing years and the completed fertility cannot be calculated for them.

Note that there are several issues when it comes to the relationship between fertility and income if we include singles. First, the completed fertility, the number of children a woman ever had, and income are somewhat systematically influenced by

Figure A6: Fertility by Income Quintile (including Singles)



Notes: We group all households including singles into quintiles based on their long-term income and calculate the average completed fertility and the childlessness rate in each quintile for cohorts born in between 1970 and 1975.

being single. Single families tend to have lower income than couples and are more likely to have lower fertility. Therefore, the positive relationship between the completed fertility and income and the negative relationship between the childlessness rate and income become stronger when we include single households (See Figure A6). The changes mostly come from the childlessness rate and from the lowest-income quintile as this group includes most of the single women.

A.7 Time Use of Parents

We calculate the average weekly working hours and the average parental time per child using the KLIPS data. We focus on adults aged between 26 and 50 (inclusive). We use *regular* working hours for wage workers and *average* working hours for non-wage workers. The total average working hours include both intensive and extensive margins. As our model does not take into account gender differences, we take the equal-weight average of both members of households. As a result, we get the total average working hours of 30.2 hours per week.

To calculate the average parental time per child, we use the supplementary survey of KLIPS on the use of time conducted in 2014. The survey respondents recorded what they did for 24 hours by a 30-minute interval. Thus, we take the total hours used

Table A8: Average Weekly Childcare Hours by Parental Education

	(1) Young children		(2) Any children	
	COL	HS	COL	HS
Mothers	23.2	25.0	15.1	14.6
No. obs.	(288)	(433)	(539)	(990)
Fathers	6.3	6.0	4.5	3.8
No. obs.	(351)	(370)	(685)	(884)

Notes: This table reports the average weekly childcare hours by parental education (1) if the minimum age of children is less than or equal to five, or (2) if the maximum age of children is less than 18. COL refers to college-educated, and HS refers to high school or below. Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations.

for childcare and multiply 7 to calculate weekly parental time. We focus on parents whose children's ages are below 18 years old. On average, mothers spend more time with children (15.8 hours per week) than fathers (4.2 hours per week). This pattern is similar to the United States, where mothers and fathers spend 14.0 and 6.8 hours per week, respectively, with their children ([Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008](#)), though the gender gap is slightly larger in Korea. Because our model does not address gender differences, we take an average of the time spent by mothers and fathers and divide it by the average number of children (1.76) to obtain average time per child (5.7 weekly hours).

Table [A8](#) reports the average childcare time by education. We consider two cases: (1) if the minimum age of children is less than or equal to five (i.e., with young children); and (2) if the maximum age of children is less than 18 (i.e., with any children). It is not clear that more educated parents spend more time with children in Korea. This is in contrast to the robust positive educational gradients in parental time observed in the United States ([Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008](#)).

A.8 Low Fertility Awareness Survey

The Korea Population, Health and Welfare Association conducted the Low Fertility Awareness Survey in 2017 ([Korea Population, Health and Welfare Association 2017](#)). Table [A9](#) shows responses to the question "What do you think are the main causes

Table A9: Survey Responses of Reasons for the Low Birth Rate

Reason for low birth rate:	Fraction	
	(1)	(2)
Financial burden of raising children (education expenses, etc.)	42.6%	64.3%
Lack of work-parenting balance culture (overtime work, etc.)	14.3%	33.3%
Delay of marriage or no marriage	13.0%	26.8%
Difficulty of getting a job	6.8%	13.0%
Changes in values for children (no children, one child)	6.4%	17.5%
Difficulty of getting a house	5.6%	12.2%
Unequal division of housework and care (childcare) toward women	4.3%	9.4%
Insufficient government support for childcare	3.2%	11.4%
Lack of day-care facilities to leave children safely	3.1%	10.8%
Economic hardship or income inequality	0.4%	0.4%

Notes: This table shows responses to the question "What do you think are the main causes of low birth rates?" Column (1) shows the portion of answers based on the first priority only. Column (2) is based on the first and second priorities. The answers are ordered based on column (1).

of low birth rates?" The answers reveal that the most important reason for the low birth rate is the financial burden of raising children, including education expenses. This result suggests that our mechanism is the most relevant to the recent cohorts' fertility decisions in Korea. On the other hand, unequal division of housework and care (childcare) toward women, which used to be considered a key driver of low fertility in Korea, is the seventh reason based on the first priority and the ninth based on the first and second priorities.

B Theoretical and Computational Appendix

B.1 Equilibrium Definition and Computation

The key object of the stationary general equilibrium is the endogenous distribution of human capital. In stationary equilibrium, \tilde{h} is constant, thus not an aggregate state variable.

A stationary equilibrium is a set of decision rules $n(h, b, \kappa^p)$, $l(h, b, \kappa, n)$, $c(h, b, \kappa, n)$, $x(h, b, \kappa, n)$, aggregate quantity L , and the distribution $F(h, b, \kappa^p)$ such that

- Given prices, households' decision problem leads to $n(h, b, \kappa^p)$, $l(h, b, \kappa, n)$, $c(h, b, \kappa, n)$, and $x(h, b, \kappa, n)$.
- Prices are competitively determined: $w = A$.
- Markets clear:

$$L = \sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int_h \sum_k^{N_\kappa} \pi_{jk}^\kappa (h (1 - \lambda n(h, b_i, \kappa_j^p) - l(h, b_i, \kappa_k, n(h, b_i, \kappa_j^p)))) F(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p). \quad (\text{A2})$$

- The stationary distribution of human capital is a fixed point:

$$\int_0^{h_c} F(dh, b_m, \kappa_k) = \frac{\sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int_{\{h | \mathfrak{h}(h, b_i, \kappa_k) \leq h_c\}} \pi_m^b \pi_{jk}^\kappa n(h, b_i, \kappa_j^p) F(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p)}{2(1 + g)} \quad (\text{A3})$$

where $\mathfrak{h}(h, b_i, \kappa_k)$ is the human capital implied by the decision rules— $n(h, b_i, \kappa^p)$ and $x(h, b_i, \kappa_k, n(h, b_i, \kappa^p))$ —and κ_k , and the population growth rate is given by

$$1 + g = \frac{\sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int_h n(h, b_i, \kappa_j^p) F(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p)}{2}. \quad (\text{A4})$$

Theoretically, \tilde{h} is also a key object but is immediately found as a by-product once we obtain the distribution. The key restriction of the equilibrium distribution is that it should be stable over time when implied by the policy functions given \tilde{h} , which

is implied by the distribution. The below algorithm uses an iterative method to find the policy tool that clears the government budget.

1. Make an initial guess for government lump-sum taxes (or transfers) T .
2. Make an initial guess for the distribution $F(h, b, \kappa_j^p)$ (which also gives \tilde{h}).
3. Given \tilde{h} and T , compute $V(h, b, \kappa_k, n)$ and the (conditional) policy functions for consumption $c(h, b, \kappa_k, n)$, investment $x(h, b, \kappa_k, n)$ and leisure $l(h, b, \kappa_k, n)$.
4. Compute the expected value function $\sum \pi_{jk}^\kappa V(h, b, \kappa_k, n)$ and based on it, obtain the policy function for fertility $n(h, b, \kappa_j^p)$.
5. Obtain the time invariant distribution $F(h, b, \kappa^p)$, based on the policy functions for fertility $n(h, b, \kappa^p)$ and $x(h, b, \kappa, n)$. obtained above.
6. Iterate from 2 to 5 until $F(h, b, \kappa^p)$ converges.
7. Compute T by checking government budget based on the policy functions and the distribution obtained above.
8. Obtain Iterate from 1 to 7 until T converges.

The stationary equilibrium definition should be generalized slightly for equilibrium along the transitional path. There are two key changes. First, the state vector additionally includes an aggregate state: \tilde{h} . Second, the last condition for the fixed-point stationary distribution is replaced by the consistency condition stating that in each period, the agents' perceived law of motion, $\tilde{h}' = \Gamma(\tilde{h})$, is consistent with the actual evolution of \tilde{h} implied by the current distribution $F(h, b_i, \kappa^p)$ and the equilibrium decision rules.

Along the transition path, the key equilibrium object is the distribution of human capital in each period over time (or mean human capital over time given the stationary distributions at the end periods). As in steady state, the key properties of these distributions are that they should be consistent with both individual agents' expectations and the actual evolution implied by the policy functions that take into account the expectation. Below is an algorithm to find the equilibrium transition that clears the government budget in each period as well, but note that there can be alternative ways of obtaining the same equilibrium.

The economy is initially in steady state. In period $t = 1$, the economy is hit by the policy change. Let \tilde{t} denote the time period sufficiently long enough so that the economy converges to the new steady state with new policy.

1. Compute the original steady state and the new steady state following the algorithms above. Store the information of the original steady state as $t = 0$ and that of the new steady state as $t = \tilde{t}$.
2. Make initial guesses for a sequence of government taxes (or transfers if negative) for each period $\{T_t\}_{t=1}^{\tilde{t}-1}$.
3. Make initial guesses for the evolution of the benchmark human capital $\{\tilde{h}_t\}_{t=2}^{\tilde{t}-1}$.
4. For each period $t = 1, \dots, \tilde{t} - 1$, given \tilde{h}_{t+1} , T_t and policy variables specified, compute the (conditional) policy functions for consumption $c_t(h, b, \kappa_j, n)$, investment $x_t(h, b, \kappa_j, n)$ and leisure $l(h, b, \kappa_j, n)_t$.
5. Compute the expected value function $\sum \pi_{jk}^\kappa V_t(h, b, \kappa_k, n; \tilde{h}_t)$ and based on it, obtain the policy function for fertility $n_t(h, b, \kappa_j^p)$ for all $t = 1, \dots, \tilde{t} - 1$.
6. Obtain the distribution $F_{t+1}(h, b, \kappa^p)$ for $t = 1, \dots, \tilde{t} - 2$, based on the policy functions for fertility $n_t(h, b, \kappa^p)$ and $x_t(h, b, \kappa_j, n)$ obtained above. Compute \tilde{h}_t based on $F_t(h, b, \kappa^p)$ for $t = 2, \dots, \tilde{t} - 1$.
7. For $t = 1, \dots, \tilde{t} - 1$, compute T_t by checking government budget based on the policy functions and the distribution obtained above.
8. Iterate from 1 to 7 until $\{T_t\}_{t=1}^{\tilde{t}-1}$ and $\{\tilde{h}_t\}_{t=2}^{\tilde{t}-1}$ converge.

B.2 Policy Effects without Externality Feedback

One might ask what role the externality plays in the policy experiments presented in Section 6. In particular, does the externality amplify or mitigate government policy? To assess this, one could set $\chi = 0$ and recompute the policy experiments. However, note that a positive χ has not only equilibrium feedback effects but also a level effect, as is investigated in Section 5. To isolate the role of equilibrium feedback channel, we thus hold the functional form constant while fixing the value of \tilde{h}

Table A10: Long-run Policy Effects without Externality Feedback

Externality Feedback?	Baseline	$\psi = .02$		$\tau_x = .20$	
	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Fertility rate n	1.92	2.08 (8.5%)	2.06 (7.4%)	2.01 (4.8%)	1.97 (3.0%)
Childlessness rate	3.4%	2.9%	3.1%	3.3%	3.5%
Avg x per kid/income	11.0%	9.9%	10.1%	7.4%	7.7%
Avg labor supply	.290	.286	.287	.275	.277
Avg human capital	3.29	3.20	3.21	3.11	3.13

at 5.78, its steady state value of the no-policy economy (i.e., treating it like a parameter). In other words, we allow no feedback effects and thereby essentially shut off the externality while keeping the functional form the same.

Table A10 reports the policy effects when we shut down the externality feedback channel. We can see that in the model without externality feedback, fertility tends to increase less and negative effects of the two policies on education expenditure become mitigated. Overall, the above results indicate that externality feedback helps the policy tools to better achieve their policy goals (i.e., raising fertility while reducing education expenditures).

B.3 Effects of Means-tested Pro-natal Transfers

Table A11 reports the long-run effects of pro-natal transfers for two cases. The first case corresponds to the universal one independent of income. The second case is means-tested in that pro-natal transfers are provided only if family income is below the income threshold level. We set the threshold level to 0.81, below which 50% of families belong to in the universal pro-natal transfer economy. To make the comparison easier, the value of $\psi = 0.0266$ is chosen such that the required ratio of taxes to output is the same in the two cases.

For a given government budget, means-tested transfers are more effective in raising the fertility rate and reducing the childlessness rate. As they operate mostly on the poorer half of the population, they also change the fertility-income relationship by more leading to a relatively large negative income elasticity of fertility. On the flip

Table A11: Long-run Effects of Pro-natal Transfers: Universal vs. Means-tested

	Pro-natal transfers		
	Baseline	Universal	Means-tested
Fertility rate n	1.92	2.08	2.14
(% change)		(8.5%)	(11.5%)
Childlessness rate	3.4%	2.9%	2.6%
Avg x per child/income	11.0%	9.9%	9.4%
Income elasticity of n	.080	-.021	-.096
Income elasticity of x	.774	.868	.867
Avg labor supply	.290	.286	.276
Avg human capital	3.29	3.20	3.14
Output per capita	.958	.918	.873
Gini income	.266	.271	.282
IGE	.330	.326	.320
T/Y		4.5%	4.5%

Notes: Numbers in parentheses show the percent change relative to the baseline model. T denotes lump-sum taxes. The second column shows the results with $\psi = 0.02$. In the last column, pro-natal transfers are assumed to be given to those below the income threshold level, which is set to 0.81 (below which 50% of families belong to in the universal pro-natal transfer economy). The value of $\psi = 0.0266$ is chosen such that the required ratio of taxes to output is the same as the second column.


side, output per capita falls by more precisely because more children are now born to parents with lower human capital and those children themselves will have lower human capital (as parents invest less but also because of a lower expected κ).

B.4 Policy Effects along the Transition

The results discussed in Section 6 capture long-run changes. But how long would it take to reach the new steady state and what would be the effects on fertility during the transition? To answer these questions, we now consider full transition dynamics. Specifically, until period 0, the economy is in the initial steady state. Then, at the beginning of period 1 ($t = 1$), a certain policy reform is introduced unexpectedly and permanently. The economy then transitions to a new steady state.

Figure A7 plots the transitional dynamics when a pro-natal transfer of $\psi = 0.02$ is introduced, unexpectedly and permanently, at the beginning of period 1. The fertil-

Figure A7: Policy Effects along the Transition: Pro-natal Transfers




Notes: A pro-natal transfer of $\psi = 0.02$ is introduced unexpectedly and permanently in period 1. A model period corresponds to 25 years.

ity rate and labor supply respond immediately when the policy is introduced, while the other aggregate variables, such as output, consumption, and human capital, decline gradually towards the new steady state. Given that the change in labor supply is quite small, the decline in output per capita is driven by the decline in aggregate human capital due to reduced spending on education.

Figure A8 shows how the key macroeconomic variables evolve during the transition to the new steady state, following educational tax changes. In period 1, right after the introduction of the tax, education spending per child (x) drops quite significantly. Since the need for funds to spend on education decreases, parents work less. The human capital of adults entering the period 1 (or the first generation) is not affected by policy changes because human capital is a state variable. However, the human capital of the following generations is affected as the first generation's endogenous investment decisions start to have intergenerational consequences. Because people have lower human capital and work less, output per capita falls over time. This demonstrates that taxing education spending to address the externality-driven distortions may not be desirable for future generations due to the adverse long-run implications for human capital accumulation.

The bottom right panel of Figure A8 shows that the first generation actually expe-

Figure A8: Policy Effects along the Transition: Private Education Taxes



Notes: The reform ($\tau_x = 0.2$) is introduced unexpectedly and permanently in period 1. A model period corresponds to 25 years.

riences an increase in consumption. Given that the quantity and quality of children both decrease, parents (the first generation) benefit from the education tax by enjoying more leisure and consumption, whereas future generations experience lower human capital and consumption relative to the initial steady state.

B.5 Ramsey Planning Problem

We consider a Ramsey-style optimal policy problem. Let us consider a social planner who faces the steady state equilibrium with $\tau_x(t) = \psi(t) = T(t) = 0$ in period $t = \dots, -2, -1, 0$. In period $t = 1$, given the distribution $F_{t=1}(h, b, \kappa^p)$, the planner is given the optimal policy instruments considered in Section 6: $\tau_x(t)$ and $\psi(t)$. The optimal policy problem is to maximize the weighted social welfare by introducing $\tau_x(t)$ and $\psi(t)$, while satisfying the period budget constraint through $T(t)$ for $t = 1, 2, \dots, \infty$. Specifically, the planner solves

$$\max_{\tau_x(t), \psi(t)} \sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int_h \varphi(\cdot) \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\kappa|\kappa^p} V_{t=1}(h, b, \kappa, n_t; \tilde{h}_t) \right\} F_{t=1}(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p)$$

subject to government budget constraints in period $t = 1, 2, \dots, \infty$:

$$\sum_j^{N_\kappa} \tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa \sum_i^{N_b} \pi_i^b \int_h [\psi(t)n_t - \tau_x(t)x_t n_t - T(t)] F_t(dh, b_i, \kappa_j^p) = 0, \quad (\text{A5})$$

where $\tilde{\pi}_j^\kappa$ captures the probability mass of κ_j^p and n_t, c_t, x_t and l_t are the policy functions that solve each family's optimization problem of (6)–(8) in each period t . We consider two possible welfare weights $\varphi(\cdot)$: (i) Negishi weights and (ii) equal weights. Next, note that we present two cases depending on policy tools allowed for the planner. The *permanent* policy reform restricts $\tau_x(t)$ and $\psi(t)$ to be $\tau_x^* \in [0, 1]$ and $\psi^* \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, respectively, for all $t = 1, 2, \dots, \infty$. On the other hand, the *temporary* policy reform allows $\tau_x(t = 1)$ and $\psi(t = 1)$ to be $\tau_x^* \in [0, 1]$ and $\psi^* \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, respectively, and $\tau_x(t) = 0$ and $\psi(t) = 0$ for all $t = 2, \dots, \infty$.

B.6 Welfare Weights

To construct Negishi weights, we estimate consumption of each household using state variables, such as h, κ^p, b , and κ . As Negishi weights are proportional to the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption (b/\hat{c} in our model), Negishi weights are constructed as follows. First, using the simulated cross-sectional data in steady state, estimate coefficients, $\{\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_1, \dots, \hat{\beta}_4\}$ from


$$\log c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log h + \beta_2 \log \kappa^p + \beta_3 \log b + \beta_4 \log \kappa + \epsilon. \quad (\text{A6})$$

Then, along the transition path, for an individual with a state vector (h, κ^p, b, κ) , we use the estimated $\{\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_1, \dots, \hat{\beta}_4\}$ to predict \hat{c} , which gives $\varphi = \hat{c}/b$. Finally, we re-scale φ in each period such that they sum up to one.

B.7 Marginal Effect of Each Policy

To better understand the importance of the two policy instruments, it is instructive to see the marginal effects of each policy instrument on the welfare of the first generation, which is portrayed in Figure A9. The change in the weighted average utilities of the first generation has a hump-shape for each policy individually in our base-

Figure A9: Effects of Each Policy on First Generation.



line model with externality feedback. By contrast, it also shows that any positive education tax or positive pro-natal transfers would reduce the welfare of the first generation in an economy without such externality feedback.


B.8 Additional Optimal Policy Results

Note that policy reforms can also take place only temporarily on the first generation to focus on addressing distortions for the first generation that has the fixed pool of agents since their parents already made fertility decisions. The optimal policy mix is a combination of $\psi = 0.0178$ and $\tau_x = 0.216$, which are virtually identical to the counterpart with permanent changes in the main text. Transitions with the optimal policy are shown in Figure A10. The temporary policy reform has almost identical effects on the first generation. After the policy change is revoked, fertility, hours worked, and education spending go back to the initial level quite quickly while human capital and output move more slowly over time.

In the optimal policy exercise in the main text, we have mainly used unequal welfare weights that are designed to focus on the distortions generated by the status externality. In this subsection, we present optimal policy results when we use equal welfare weights, which are widely used in the quantitative macroeconomics literature. This exercise illustrates that these equal weights put substantial motives for redistribution, as compared to our baseline welfare weights.

When we use the equal welfare weights, the optimal policy mix sets higher education tax rates while the pro-natal transfer is zero $\psi = 0.0$ whether policy changes

Figure A10: Optimal Policy: Unexpected and Temporary Policy Reform




Notes: The optimal policy reform is introduced unexpectedly and temporarily in period 1. Welfare is measured by Negishi-weighted average utility. A model period corresponds to 25 years.

are permanent or not. Specifically, when policy changes are permanent, optimal $\tau_x = 0.397$ with externality feedback, which is considerably larger than the optimal tax $\tau_x = 0.167$ without it. When the externality feedback is shutdown, the optimal policy leads to the welfare gain for the first generation that is smaller than its counterpart in the baseline model with externality. Figure A11 shows the transition dynamics with respect to these two optimal policies for their corresponding economies (with/without externality feedback). When policy changes are only temporary, optimal policies are similar: $\tau_x = 0.398$ with externality feedback and $\tau_x = 0.161$ without it, both along with $\psi = 0.0$. Figure A12 shows the transition dynamics with these optimal policies.

Finally, the top panel of Figure A13 plots the effects of education tax (marginal effects) on the first generation's welfare when equal welfare weights are used. Its bottom panel shows the counterparts of pro-natal transfers.

Figure A11: Optimal Policy (Unexpected and Permanent Reform) with Equal Welfare Weights




Notes: The optimal policy reform is introduced unexpectedly and permanently in period 1. Welfare is measured by equally-weighted average utility. "Benchmark" shows the results when externality feedback is operative through changing benchmark human capital. "No feedback" shuts down externality feedback. A model period corresponds to 25 years.

Table A12: Heterogeneous Effects of Optimal Policy on the First Generation with Equal Welfare Weights


Average		Income quintile					All
		1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Fertility, n	Baseline	1.78	1.89	1.94	1.99	1.97	1.92
	Optimal	2.02	2.10	2.06	2.05	1.97	2.04
	% change	+13.6	+11.2	+6.3	+3.1	+0.1	+6.6
Childlessness rate (%)	Baseline	5.2	2.9	3.1	3.0	2.7	3.4
	Optimal	3.6	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2
	p.p. change	-1.6	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.5	-0.2
Investment per child, x	Baseline	.061	.080	.096	.115	.175	.106
	Optimal	.028	.037	.045	.057	.088	.051
	% change	-54.9	-54.4	-52.6	-51.0	-49.9	-52.0

Figure A12: Optimal Policy (Unexpected and Temporary Reform) with Equal Welfare Weights



Notes: The optimal policy reform is introduced unexpectedly and temporarily in period 1. Welfare is measured by the change in equally-weighted average utility. "Benchmark" shows the results when externality feedback is operative through changing benchmark human capital. "No feedback" shuts down externality feedback. A model period corresponds to 25 years.

Figure A13: Effects of Each Policy on First Generation with Equal Welfare Weights




B.9 Details on the Tournament Model


Table A13: Internally Calibrated Parameters for Tournament Model

Parameter & Interpretation	Moment	Model	Data
$\phi_1 = 1.22$	Utility from number of children	Pr(# child = 1)	.199
$\phi_2 = 1.98$		Pr(# child = 2)	.629
$\phi_3 = 2.43$		Pr(# child ≥ 3)	.146
$\sigma_\kappa = .508$	Ability dispersion	Gini income	.223
$\nu = 1.57$	Leisure constant	Avg total hours worked	.308
$\sigma_b = .429$	Preference dispersion	Income elasticity of fertility	.082
$\iota_0 = .420$	Location of zero prob.	Childless in 1st income quintile	.055
$\iota_1 = .283$	Inv. externality	Education inv. spillover estimate	.039
$\iota_2 = .858$	Curvature of Π	Share of the college-educated	.762
$\theta = .266$	HK production technology	Avg investment-income ratio	.097
$\alpha = .662$		Income elasticity of investment	.762
$\rho_\kappa = .251$	Ability persistence	Intergenerat. income elasticity	.311
$A_h = 6.06$	HK scale	Output per capita (normalization)	.939

Figure A14: Tournament Model



A. Equilibrium Distribution of College Probabilities



B. College Probability by Child Human Capital